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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
THREE ESSAYS ON ENTREPRENEURIAL MOTIVATIONS, ENTRY, EXIT AND 
MONETARY REWARDS 
by 
Dmitriy Krichevskiy 
Florida International University, 2011 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Peter Thompson, Major Professor 
This dissertation analyzes rewards and motivations of self-employment. In light of recent 
research contributions of Barton Hamilton (2000), which find entrepreneurship not as financially 
rewarding as wage work, my dissertation attempts to both verify and explain this claim. The first 
essay proposes a theoretical model of evolution of erroneous earnings expectations on part of a 
nascent entrepreneur. Inability to observe, survey, and take into account all of the returns to 
entrepreneurship prior to business entry creates a biased set of beliefs on part of the potential 
entrants. Using Bayesian learning, a nascent entrepreneur starting out with correct perception of 
profit distribution arrives at erroneous beliefs by incorporating limited information collected from 
existing businesses. An observed distribution of surviving businesses would exhibit higher 
earnings because of previous, unobserved, business failure entrepreneur get an overly positive 
view of her profit potential. Hence, the chapter offers a unique method of modeling 
overconfidence.  
The second essay undertakes dynamic empirical comparison of earnings received by 
business owners and their wage counterparts. Using Survey of Income and Program Participation 
(SIPP) I examine both short and long run returns to entrepreneurship comparing theses rewards to 
wage earners returns. I pay particular attention to transitions into and out of business ownership. I 
estimate entire earnings distribution. To characterize dynamic aspect of changes to individuals’ 
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earnings I split the income distribution into five income quintiles and follow survey participants 
over the period of seven years. I find that period-to-period transitions to be Markovian. I find 
business tenure to be short, business ownership is costly in the short and rewarding in the long 
run.   
The third essay considered different reporting schemes applied to the self-employed. It is 
another empirical investigation of entrepreneurial earning uses Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID). I find entrepreneurs while reporting lower than wage workers earnings enjoy significant 
consumption premiums. I observe evidence of income underreporting by entrepreneurs. This 
finding suggests a need for better earning comparison metrics and proposes to use consumption 
rather than income metrics for future comparisons.  
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I. Introduction 
Entrepreneurship is considered to be a vital element of a market society. Although 
entrepreneurial undertakings predate economics as a science, our understanding of motivations, 
rewards and entrepreneurial decision-making remains very limited. Some people end up being 
better entrepreneurs than others. Economists have created the term “entrepreneurial ability” term 
to reflect the differences. However, without individuals attempting entrepreneurship this 
entrepreneurial ability, strongly correlated with success of business venture, remains unobserved 
and thus non-measurable. At the same time society places a great emphasis on promoting and 
supporting business ownership. Entrepreneurial vigor, creativity, inventiveness, and dedication 
are credited with being the main driving force behind innovation, technological progress, 
economic growth, and a major building block of any progressive society. 
Even the motivations for entrepreneurship remain unclear and contested. Adam Smith, 
the father of economic science, gave self-interest a central role in our society. He stipulated that it 
is self-interest that motivates people to act. In Smith’s view, business owners pursue profits. 
Opportunity to gain is the sole motivator for organization or increase in production. Increases in 
scientific rigor together with emergence of sophisticated statistical techniques, theoretical models 
and modern computing have enabled researches to document rewards received by both wage 
earners and the self-employed. Recent findings by Hamilton (2000) suggest that self-employment 
is not as lucrative as once believed. In fact, Hamilton found self-employment to be less rewarding 
than wage work. This finding stood at odds with another common belief, popularized by Frank 
Knight (1923), stating that entrepreneurs take on the risk of business ownership in hopes of 
earning more than their wage counterparts.  
The voluntary nature of career choices, including self-employment, puts a big question 
mark on Smith’s and Knights’ assertions. How can a profit-seeking individual choose a risky 
venture knowing there are no rewards? Three possibilities arise from this risk-earnings paradox. 
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First, Adam Smith could have been wrong about entrepreneurial motivations. Something other 
than profit could motivate people to pursue self-employment. Second, entrepreneurs may have 
been unaware about their true profit prospects. Finally, modern findings (Hamilton, 2000; 
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002) suggesting that entrepreneurship does not pay might 
have missed something. Entrepreneurial motivation is hard to measure as it is both subjective and 
highly dependent on the success of a given venture. My research makes no attempt to measure or 
test entrepreneurial motivations. I believe Mr. Smith got it right nearly 250 years ago. My 
research takes another step in the direction of understanding profit-seeking motivations for entry, 
exit and rewards of entrepreneurship, suggesting and testing the possibility of misinformed entry 
and missing rewards.   
In the first chapter I begin by putting forward a model in which entrepreneurs are profit 
seekers, estimating their future earnings potential and entering if those estimates exceed their 
wage opportunity costs. The process by which those expectations are formed is modeled 
explicitly with particular attention paid to the quality of information nascent entrepreneurs 
receive. The nature of the information available at the time of entry skews expectations of nascent 
entrepreneur sand creates an overly optimistic estimate of profit potential. Inability to observe, 
survey, and take into account all of the returns to entrepreneurship prior to business entry creates 
a biased set of beliefs on the part of potential entrants. Using Bayesian learning, our nascent 
entrepreneur, starting out with the correct perception of the profit distribution, arrives at 
erroneous beliefs by incorporating limited information collected from existing businesses. An 
observed distribution of surviving businesses would exhibit higher earnings because of previous, 
unobserved, business failures; entrepreneurs get an overly positive view of their profits potential. 
The magnitude of the bias depends on the strength of prior beliefs, the number and variance of 
observations collected, the length of period dedicated to information collection prior to entry, and 
on the age of a particular industry. My model predicts that waiting and collecting earnings 
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information prior to entry reduces bias. Additionally, entirely new industries with no prior 
failures provide more balanced and less biased profit estimates for potential entrepreneurs. 
Having a strong prior belief would reduce this bias if the belief is consistent with the true 
distribution of earnings. Gathering more information in the same time period rather than having a 
longer observation span increases the bias. Industries where survival is toughest would create the 
most bias.  
The second essay undertakes a dynamic empirical comparison of earnings received by 
business owners and their wage counterparts. I hypothesize that, if there is a short term cost 
associated with undertaking business ownership, it must be offset by the long term benefits if 
wage workers are to switch to entrepreneurship. Using the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP), I examine both short- and long-run returns to entrepreneurship, comparing 
theses rewards to wage earners’ returns. I pay particular attention to transitions into and out of 
business ownership. I estimate the entire earnings distribution for every month in the seven years 
covered by the data. To characterize the dynamic aspect of changes to individuals’ earnings I split 
the entire income distribution into five income quintiles and follow survey participants over the 
period of seven years using both month-to-month and quarter-to-quarter transitions. I find period 
to period income transitions to be Markovian regardless of observation frequency. For short term 
transitions there are four groups of people at any point of time: there are people who remain in 
either wage or business sector from one period to the next. There are two additional groups 
representing people transitioning from the wage sector to the business sector and vice versa. I 
calculate explicitly short term income mobility odds for each of the groups in the sample. I find 
business tenure to be short and business ownership to be costly in the short run, reflected by less 
favorable income mobility odds faced by agents transitioning back into wage sector paired with a 
high likelihood of business failure.  I test my hypothesis of long-run rewards to business 
ownership by making use of the Markov property of period-to-period transitions. The nature of 
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the limiting distributions restricts my long run analysis to three groups: successful business 
owners, wage workers, and all entrepreneurs regardless of business success.  I derive the 
corresponding limiting distributions for three groups of agents. I find business ownership to be 
rewarding in the long run, reflected by better income improvement odds faced by all 
entrepreneurs, successful or otherwise, when compared to wage workers. 
In my third essay I question the accuracy of most wage to self-employment earnings 
comparisons. I hypothesize that, because of different tax code metrics and earning reporting 
schemes, a significant portion of earning received by business owners fall through the cracks. 
Essentially there are core differences in both what and how earnings are reported as income. In 
the case of wage earners, their corresponding employees report wage rates, benefits and taxes on 
behalf of the wage workers, whereas for entrepreneurs a more complicated self-reporting scheme 
is implemented. The entrepreneur has an option of investing a freely chosen percentage of 
earnings back into his or her business. This portion of entrepreneurial earnings would not qualify 
as earnings kept. Additionally, business owners can deduct many expenses as monies spent on 
business. The line between business expenses and pure consumption is often blurry. For example, 
a business lunch paid by the business owners and deducted as business expense is common 
practice for many business relationships including sales, negotiations, and employee 
relationships. At the same time this business lunch leads to a clear set of savings on part of the 
business owner who would spend less on his personal food expenditure. A company car is 
another example of a business expense that the entrepreneur can use however she sees fit without 
it being reflected on her earnings. Hence, to examine the true benefits of being self-employed, 
consumption has to be considered. I claim that there is a substantial consumption premium 
enjoyed by the entrepreneur even if one were to exclude all the pure business expenses from the 
comparison. I find consumption metrics to be more universal with one notable downside: 
generally, consumption data are only available for the households rather than individuals. 
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Therefore, the definition of self-employment has to be a changed to definition of a self-employed 
household rather than individual. I deem any household containing at least one person who is an 
entrepreneur a self-employed household.  
To test the income underreporting hypothesis I examine the 2003 version of the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), with which I compare wage earners to the self-employed 
using both income and household consumption data. I find a significantly large consumption 
premium enjoyed by households who have at least one entrepreneur as a member. Using 
established facts about entrepreneurial saving behavior together with PSID data, I find significant 
evidence of income underreporting on the part of the entrepreneur. In short, knowing that 
entrepreneurs save more than their wage counterparts, one would expect an interaction of income 
and self-employment when being regressed on consumption to produce a negative sign. If the 
sign of this term is positive, then it must be that the income data are faulty, essentially implying 
income underreporting.  I detect income underreporting using this method and applying it to 
various parts of the income distribution via quintile regression. As a robustness check, I repeat the 
underreporting search using an alternative assumption and also detecting income underreporting. 
Assuming that all agents surveyed by PSID have their true marginal propensity to consume 
unrelated to their employment type and using ten years of income data from PSID, I detect 
changes in the empirical marginal propensities to consume occurring together with transitions 
into self-employment.   I attribute these changes in the empirical marginal propensity to consume 
to changes in the reporting metric as it is applied upon an individual’s entry into self-
employment. These changes in reporting schemes distort the corresponding earnings data, 
creating biased income comparisons. Hence, I suggest using consumption rather than income 
metrics whenever there is a wage-worker entrepreneur earning comparison.  
In this dissertation I make the following three contributions to the existing literature: 
First, I create theoretical groundwork for an overconfident entrepreneur whose initial beliefs are 
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correct. Previous models of overconfident entrepreneurs introduced overconfidence as an 
exogenous factor. My model suggests that the proper support of entrepreneurial undertakings 
involves relating a complete picture, including failure, to nascent entrepreneurs. Both the business 
school case study approach and the Small Business Administration’s support structures heavily 
favor successful cases. This is dangerous and can lead to excessive failure and inefficiencies. 
Second, I observe an overwhelming number of business tenures that are very short. I document 
short-run costs of returning to the wage sector reflected by increased odds of moving down in the 
income distribution. At the same time I find that business undertaking has some benefits in the 
long run reflected by improved odds of moving up in the limiting income distribution. To my 
knowledge, this is the first time anyone has estimated long-run costs and benefits via limiting 
distributions. Hence, business ownership is costly in the short run and rewarding in the long run. 
Finally, I detect underreporting of income by entrepreneurs. This underreporting of earnings 
raises questions about the reliability of previous earnings comparisons and suggests a need for 
better earnings comparison metrics. I propose a different, consumption-based metric for 
comparing benefits accruing to entrepreneurs and wage workers. Using the proposed 
consumption metric, I document the rewards to entrepreneurship and compare them to wage work 
returns. I find that households who have at least one member who is self-employed to be better 
off in terms of consumption.  
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II.  Limited Information and Entry Decision: A source of Entrepreneurial    
Overconfidence 
 
1. Introduction 
One of the major stumbling blocks for researchers studying entrepreneurship has been the 
fact that average returns to business ownership are too low. More specifically, entrepreneurs (on 
average) earn less than their wage earning counterparts (Hamilton 2000). This finding is true both 
for initial earnings and for earnings growth differentials. This paper seeks to provide an 
explanation for these differentials and for their persistence. The realization of this stark earnings 
difference is quite recent (older studies either did not find a difference or could not estimate self-
employed earnings reliably). It is mostly because of the fact that true profits of entrepreneurs are 
an elusive variable. One of the common beliefs about business ownership is that founders often 
underreport their true profits by overstating business expenses. Some early studies (Brock & 
Evans, 1986; Rees & Shah, 1986; Borjas & Bornars, 1989; Evans & Leighton, 1989) found no 
significant differences in earnings between the self-employed and wage earners. In contrast, a 
more recent and more detailed examination has shown clear differences (Hamilton, 2000). 
There are several problems from which previous studies suffered. First, the superstar 
theory proposed by Rosen (1981) may play a big role here; this theory suggests that wage 
to profit comparisons of averages may not be an appropriate measure since profits are highly 
skewed towards few superstars at the right tail of profit distribution. An equally important 
problem is that data used in all of these papers lack important information such as the length of 
business ownership (Hamilton 2000). Finally, net profits (as reported to the IRS) are used as a 
typical measure of self-employment income. Reporting less income to the IRS leaves a business’ 
owners with more earnings to keep. Hamilton (2000) took several steps towards addressing these 
concerns. For example, he tracked business ownership over ten years, which allowed him to 
construct a better earnings approximation for the self-employed. This has enabled him to get a 
8 
 
better picture of business’ profits since choices to sell the venture reflected some of the 
unreported true business values. Hamilton used the 1984 Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP), which tracks 8,771 male school leavers aged 18-65 over a ten year period 
(leavers implies all males exiting high school with a diploma, or otherwise). In addition to better 
approximating business’ earnings Hamilton examined the business population more closely (by 
means of quantile regression) rather than a simple average comparison to address any superstar 
theory concerns. As a result, he found that self-employed earnings were dominated by incomes of 
wage earners with similar characteristics (such as experience, age, education, etc.). Two years 
later another study confirmed this result (Moskowitz and Vising-Jorgensen 2002). These findings 
beg the question: Why would anyone choose to become an entrepreneur? 
 This paper offers an explanation of this seemingly suboptimal choice. It points to the 
importance of information in the decision-making process of potential entrepreneurs. Information 
plays a vital role when evaluating the expected profits of a venture. Any agent who enters an 
industry must initially hold beliefs that their expected future profits will outweigh any entry costs. 
At the same time, these expected profits should compare favorably to the highest valued 
alternative. After entry, an agent compares her realized profit to her previous expectations, and 
updates her beliefs. In this paper I model this process (of entry, and consequential beliefs update) 
in order to gain insight into the entry and exit dynamics of entrepreneurship. In my model, 
whenever there are some informational limitations the analysis of future profit potential produces 
an overestimated value of expected profits. As a result there will be a number of agents entering 
erroneously, only to exit as soon as actual profits are realized and beliefs are updated. This need 
not be the case for all agents. As long as there are some who rely on erroneous information, 
overentry and inefficiency will prevail. As a result, there is a continuous overentry driven by new 
agents with incorrect expectations, which essentially explains why some entrepreneurs are 
overconfident. The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature and examines 
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where this theory fits in; Section 3 develops the model; Section 4 discusses potential implications 
and tractable avenues for empirical examination; and, Section 5 concludes and summarizes the 
contributions of this paper.  
 
2. Literature Review 
This paper offers a mechanism that may be responsible for the overconfident behavior of 
the entrepreneur. In this model, an entrepreneur behaves in what seems to be an irrational manner 
because there is a mistake in the information used for making an entry decision. This model 
neither excludes nor proves any of the previously posed explanations wrong. Other explanations 
for this entrepreneurial behavior and observed wage differentials include taste-for-variety, risk 
aversion, and overconfidence. All of the proposed explanations have some legitimacy and are not 
mutually exclusive. One of the most obvious ways to explain this seemingly irrational behavior is 
to assume that there is some additional utility that entrepreneurs get from business ownership. 
Hamilton himself concluded: “selfemployment earning differential reflects entrepreneurs’ 
willingness to sacrifice substantial earnings in exchange for nonpecuniary benefits of owning a 
business.” (Hamilton, 2000) 
Another, the oldest explanation, dates back to Adam Smith, Schumpeter and Knight 
defines the role of an entrepreneur as the risk bearer. This was first formally modeled by 
Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979). In Kihlstrom and Laffont’s model, agents differ in their risk 
preferences; consequently, more risk tolerant individuals choose to be entrepreneurs. This model 
separates individuals into two groups (workers and entrepreneurs) based on risk. Some 
inefficiencies may arise from the same assumptions and mechanisms which are the driving force 
behind their conclusions. Since all agents (including entrepreneurs) have different risk 
preferences, in equilibrium entrepreneurs choose to produce different amounts of goods. This 
may lead to inefficiency. Another potential source of inefficiency is that wage earners do not bear 
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any risk at all; thus, if there are risk averse (but able) entrepreneurs, they do not get to put 
themselves to the best use. 
Most recent and the closest to my proposed model explanation is that of the 
overconfident entrepreneur. In this view, the entrepreneur is not able to estimate her chances for 
success correctly because of the fact that she holds erroneous beliefs about her ability. Analogous 
to the Winner’s Curse (Thaler 1992), the most overconfident person undertakes the path of 
business ownership. The agents not pursuing business ownership are those that are able to 
estimate their chances for success correctly; hence, realizing that it is not worth it, they choose 
not to pursue business ownership. Overconfidence theory has an entrepreneur evaluating her 
chances for success, which in this case means assessing her own ability. 
Overconfidence has been studied for some time by psychologists, economists and 
business scholars. Psychologists have long known that people overestimate low probabilities 
(chances of winning a lottery) and underestimate high probabilities (chances of getting lung 
cancer for smokers). Studies of overconfidence in psychology goes back to Kahneman and 
Tversky (1973), with more recent experiments finding that people update their beliefs only mildly 
whenever presented with new and relevant information, which leads to overconfidence (Brenner 
et al. 1996). Business literature has also found that status quo bias is an impediment to 
incorporating relevant information into the decision making-process and therefore leads to biases 
(Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988). Rabin (1996) wrote a bridge paper to expose economists to 
many of these psychological findings, including that of overconfidence. Lowe and Ziedonis 
(2006) found that entrepreneurs continue unsuccessful development efforts much longer when 
compared to corporations. But their study did not include length of time in the industry as a 
variable. This might simply imply that corporations are farther along their learning curve. It also 
seems that there is a simple selection problem associated with Lowe and Ziedonis (2006). 
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Namely, better start-ups are now actually corporations. In general, the results of studies linking 
entrepreneurs and overconfidence are mixed. 
Brennan and Torous (1999) study the behavior of investors and find that investors tend to 
be overconfident (all investors); this is mainly driven by less than optimal portfolio 
diversification. Barber and Odean (2001) find men to be more confident than women. Results on 
whether overconfidence is socially efficient are mixed as well. Bernardo and Welch (2000) put 
forward a model in which the overconfidence of some individuals is essential for group survival. 
Puri and Robinson (2005) find that overconfident individuals choose to work more, which may be 
socially optimal. Eric Van Den Steen (2004) formalized choice-driven overoptimism in his paper. 
He models the evolution and persistence of the overconfidence with most overconfident agents 
pursuing entrepreneurship. The source of overconfidence in all of the above models is not 
explicitly modeled--some agents are assumed to be overconfident without explaining how they 
got there. For example, in Van Den Steen’s model, agents have different priors (ex ante) which 
lead them to have different posterior beliefs (some end up forming overly optimistic 
expectations). 
In my model, agents end up making suboptimal choices derived from the same set of 
prior beliefs, which is a correct set of beliefs (correct in the sense that it holds information about 
the true distribution of an industry’s profits). Essentially, in my model, all agents know something 
about the true profit distribution. They all know the variance, but what is left to estimate is the 
expected earnings on which an entry decision is to be made. In my model, just like in Steen’s, 
some agents end up forming an overly optimistic expectation of their profit potential. Biased 
posterior beliefs are a product of the limited information sample (I assume limited information is 
a product of competition) collected and analyzed by agents. An agent is evaluating her chances of 
success; her own ability is kept outside of the picture. Instead, the primary factor responsible for 
the estimation of future profits is an estimate derived from a sample of profit observations 
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collected from the industry. In reality, there are estimates of one’s own ability and industry profit 
potentials for any agent contemplating entry. However, my model concentrates on the assessment 
of the state of industry’s profits. More specifically, I look at the potential entrant evaluating the 
overall profitability of a given industry. 
As in previous theories, this paper seeks to provide an explanation for the earnings 
differentials phenomena. In my model, overentry occurs whenever there is some profit 
information hidden from an entrepreneur who is contemplating entry. This information is hidden 
as a result of competition in the industry, which weeds out less successful firms. Over time there 
are some firms that draw low profits from the profit distribution, whenever these profits are too 
low to remain in the industry these firms exit. Hence, the remaining population of firms will have 
a higher average profit. Considering the population of existing firms in the estimation of future 
profits leads to a substantial bias since all the firms that ever had existed must be included in a 
true population. 
Focusing attention on the problem of limited information has most recently been 
undertaken by Jerker Denrell (2003). He shows how undersampling may lead to systematic bias. 
The main argument of his paper is that firms and managers learn from each other, but in practice 
managers tend to pay more attention to the best managerial practices and to the best managers. 
This practice implies that the resulting sample is not representative of the whole manager/firm 
population. My model draws from the same idea. My goal is to explain the behavior of entry; 
specifically the entrepreneur’s decision process. I model the Bayesian learning processes 
explicitly. I first show, how even based on the correct prior information, bias arises and persists. I 
then explore the properties of the bias as well as possible remedies. 
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3. Model 
To evaluate the role of information in entrepreneurial entry it is useful to first ask 
whether potential entrants try to gauge their chances of success using some sort of information 
gathering process. There is already evidence suggesting that an entrepreneur conducts a search 
prior to opening a business (Cooper, Folta & Woo, 1995). My paper examines the type and length 
of search among 1176 new entrepreneurs in a survey conducted by the National Federation of 
Independent Business (NFIB). Cooper et al. (1995) found that potential entrepreneurs with no 
relevant experience conducted an extensive search prior to entry. These researchers also found 
that a significant part of entrepreneurs’ searches involved surveying other business owners. The 
second finding of Cooper et al. is that entrepreneurs with extensive experience conducted a less 
thorough search. A similar search process, along with a resulting entry decision, is what my 
model has at its core. In order to gauge agents’ profit potential, entrepreneurs need to collect 
profit information from existing businesses to update their prior beliefs about the profitability of a 
venture. My model uses a Bayesian framework, where variances serve as weights in an updating 
process; a larger weight on prior information makes new information less valuable. 
What about the finding that asserts experienced entrepreneurs search less? In essence, a 
more experienced entrepreneur has already collected a significant amount of information, which 
now serves as her prior distribution in the updating process. Thus, an experienced potential 
entrepreneur will spend fewer resources in going after additional information. Important evidence 
found by Cooper et al. is that the all entrepreneurs undertake this assessment (search) prior to 
entry. My model posits that this assessment is a primary criterion in the decision-making process. 
Cooper et al. essentially examined the evidence for the process of assessment prior to entry, 
which is in line with the mechanism that I propose. Cooper et al. states that the only theory (Lord 
& Maher 1990) which sets out to explain information search is not consistent with the evidence. 
Cooper et al. (1995) goes on to point out that Lord and Maher’s (1990) theory suggested the 
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complete opposite to the evidence collected by Cooper et al. While it is not a primary goal of this 
model to produce a new search theory, the results concerning search are well in line with this 
evidence provided by Cooper et al. (1995). 
To model this mechanism by which prior beliefs are updated using new information, 
several assumptions need to be made. First, I assume that all agents are equal in their ability. 
Hence, the only factors on which the entry decisions are to be made are prior beliefs about the 
profitability of a venture and any new information (collected by an agent) which can improve 
upon those beliefs. For simplicity, I assume that there are two distributions involved in the 
mechanism: distribution of profits (unknown to the observer) and a distribution of signals. Both 
of them are normal. Agents are able to estimate future profits based on signals. However, the 
individual profit draw, which an agent gets upon entry, remains unknown. Let the profit 
distribution take the following form: 
݌	~	ܰሺµ, σஜଶ)                                                                                                          (1) 
Agents who choose to enter draw profits from this distribution. Assume that, while the 
whole distribution cannot be seen by people contemplating entry, the variance of the distribution 
(σஜଶ) is common knowledge. This information is known to all agents and is essentially an 
unbiased (correct) prior belief. An entrepreneur who draws profit from this distribution will earn 
this profit from the first period after entry onwards forever. Incumbent firms communicate their 
true profits to potential entrants via signals si (whether they want to or not); these signals are 
stochastically related to agents’ true profits. I assume that firms cannot think strategically when it 
comes to their signals: they have to report their profits honestly. This way, the incumbents cannot 
misinform the observer and deter entry. Assume a signal is characterized by: 
si =p + εi                                                                                                                 (2) 
with εi ~N (0, σఌଶ). Here, I also assume that the precision of the white noise is known to the 
potential observer.  A collection of these signals could be viewed as the new information 
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available to an entrant. These signals are used in a likelihood function to update prior beliefs and 
to form posterior beliefs. Posterior profit expectations could be estimated, which will enable 
agents to make an informed entry choice. The driving assumption behind the conclusions is the 
following: I assume that only operating firms can send these signals to an observer. Firms that 
have exited (in previous periods) no longer post this information. In reality, this information is 
probably obtainable but it is costly. I make these costs prohibitive in order to simplify the analysis 
and to have cleaner results. Immediately, it is clear that agents could differ in two respects: 1) 
agents know that this inaccessible information (profits of firms that have failed) exists; and, 2) 
agents are not aware of the fact that some information is missing. For simplicity, call them 
“Informed” and “Uninformed” agents, respectively. I further assume that entrepreneurs cannot 
make buying offers to one another, making it impossible for informed agents to take advantage of 
the uninformed. Since the distribution of profits is truncated from the left it essentially hides a 
portion of signals from an observer. Another important assumption is that those firms which 
perform poorly fail and exit. This supposition enables me to simplify exit decisions to a one 
dimensional analysis in which only profits and alternative wages matter to entrepreneurs. Entrants 
end up using a simple decision rule: getting high enough profit means staying while drawing a 
low profit forces them to immediately exit. Let β represent the truncation point separating failed 
firms from incumbents.  An observer collects n signals from a Normal distribution with an 
unobserved mean and σఌଶ variance. 
Applying the standard Bayesian formula (e.g., de Groot, ch. 9), the posterior belief of an 
uninformed agent is: 
ܧ൫݌หݏଵ	,ݏଶ	, … , ݏ௡൯ ≡ μ௡ ൌ ஜ஢ഄ
మ
஢ഄమା௡஢ಔమ ൅
஢ಔమ ∑ ୱ೔೙೔సభ
஢ഄమା௡஢ಔమ                                                         (3) 
Because the uninformed agent believes she is well informed she just assumes that the observed n 
signals are drawn from a standard normal distribution. At the same time, an informed agent is 
well aware of the fact that the distribution is truncated such that		ݏ௜	 ൒ 	ߚ. She is, however, 
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interested in a true value of		∑ ݏ௜௡௜ୀଵ , which would have been observable if the distribution was 
not truncated. The expected value of the truncated signals is: 
 
ܧሾݏሿ ൌ 	 ݌̂ ൅ σఌ ௘
షభ మൗ
ሺഁష೛ෝሻమ
ಚഄమ
׬ ௘షభ మൗ ೟మಮሺഁష೛ෝሻ
ಚഄ
൘
ௗ௧                                                                           (4) 
where we denote agent’s maximum likelihood estimate of profit as	݌̂. This estimate is based 
solely on the information available to an observer. Then, ݌̂ is given by the solution to (4), (see, 
for example Selvin (1976, eqn [2])), so the expected value of observed signals is defined 
implicitly by:  
݌̂= ଵ௡ ∑ ݏ௜			௡௜ୀଵ െ	σఌ
௘
షభ మൗ
ሺഁష೛ෝሻమ
ಚഄమ
׬ ௘షభ మൗ ೟మಮሺഁష೛ሻ
ಚഄ
൘
ௗ௧                                                                    (5) 
Let ̅ݏ = ଵ௡ ∑ ݏ௜௡௜ୀଵ , and let g(̅ݏ) denote the above solution. The decision maker knows (or is able to 
derive) (5). She will then use this estimate in a similar fashion (as in (3)) to obtain: 
ܧ൫݌หݏଵ	,ݏଶ	, … , ݏ௡: ݏ ൐ β	൯ = ஜ஢ഄ
మ
஢ഄమା௡஢ಔమ ൅
஢ಔమ 	௡௚ሺ௦̅ሻ	
஢ഄమା௡஢ಔమ                                                                    (6) 
An informed agent will use all of the available information (including relevant information about 
this truncation), and she then incorporates all of this information in her estimate. Equation (6) 
provides the correct Bayesian posterior belief about profit potential. This correct belief is accurate 
in the sense that it is unbiased. Bias is then determined by subtracting (6) from (3): 
ܤ௡=	 ௡஢ഄ ஢ಔ
మሺ௦̅ି୥ሺ௦̅ሻሻ
൫஢ഄమା௡஢ಔమ൯ ׬ ௘షభ మൗ ೟మಮሺഁష೛ෝሻ
ಚഄ
൘
ௗ௧                                                                                            (7) 
Proposition 1: If the likelihood function is truncated from the left, then the observer who uses 
Bayesian updating will overestimate his/her expected profits. (ܤ௡ ൐ 0ሻ 
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Note immediately that ܤ௡ ൌ ௡஢ഄ ሺ௦̅ି୥ሺ௦̅ሻሻ	׬ ௘షభ మൗ ೟మಮሺഁష೛ෝሻ
ಚഄ
൘
ௗ௧ 	∗
ଵ
൫஢ഄమା௡஢ಔమ൯               with 
௡
൫஢ഄమା௡஢ಔమ൯ ൐ 0, and 
ܽ݊݀	̅ݏ െ gሺ̅ݏሻ ൌ 	 ஢ഄ ௘
షభ మൗ
ሺഁష೛ෝሻమ
ಚഄమ
׬ ௘షభ మൗ ೟మಮሺഁష೛ෝሻ
ಚഄ
൘
ௗ௧ > 0 for all parameters implying
1 	ܤ௡ ൐ 0	∎           
The above proposition states that whenever a potential entrepreneur is observing an 
industry and does not take previous exiting firms (and their profits) into consideration, she is 
bound to end up with an overly optimistic estimate for her profit potential. 
i) Prior Uncertainty 
Bias has several parameters that affect its magnitude. I first consider prior beliefs and 
how the quality of these beliefs affects the resulting estimate. Prior information is captured by	σஜ	ଶ , 
which reflects the quality of prior beliefs. Differentiating bias with respect to σஜ 	is straight 
forward and yields: 
 
డ஻೙
డఙഋ ൌ
ଶ௡௘
షሺ೛ෝషഁሻ
మ
మ഑ഄమ
ටమഏఙഋఙഄయ
൫௡ఙഋమାఙഄమ൯మሺଵାா௥௙൤೛ෝషഁ√మ഑ഄ൨ሻ
                                                                                                (8) 
 
This effect is strictly positive for all values of parameters (i.e., ߲ܤ௡ ߲σஜ⁄ ൐ 0ሻ.This 
means that the greater one’s prior uncertainty, the worse the bias. This arises from the simple fact 
that a reduction in the precision of correct information (σஜଶ) is the variance of the true profit 
distribution) forces an observer to put more weight on the biased information captured by the 
likelihood function. One can think of this as a situation in which this agent has an initial idea 
about profit potential. The profit potential is denoted by an interval. This agent then goes on and 
                                                 
1 For a more formal discussion of posterior moments arising from truncated likelihood, see Balakrishnan 
and Ma (2001). 
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collects more information. But, the wider the interval the more uncertain is the agent about what 
to make of this information. Thus, she trusts this newly collected (biased) information more as a 
result. 
ii) The number of Signals  
Does collecting more signals help? Intuition suggests that a deeper search may return 
better (less biased) results. As it turns out, collecting more signals does not help  (߲ܤ௡ ߲݊⁄ ൐ 0ሻ. 
Collecting more signals means that an observer is actually more misinformed. This is due to the 
fact that collecting signals from truncated distributions forces an observer to place more weight 
on the information carried by these signals. Therefore, increasing the number of signals does not 
alleviate the bias because all other signals are drawn from this incomplete distribution, which is 
misleading. Thus, getting larger samples of these signals is not only unhelpful in reducing the 
degree of misinformation, but it even makes the problem worse. 
 
iii) Noisy Signals  
If the collected signals are very noisy, then the correlation between an agent’s profit and 
the profits of incumbents is weak. Knowing that the noise level is high, an observer will not know 
what to make of this information and will put less weight on the information extracted from 
signals; this should reduce resulting bias. However, if truncation is severe (truncation point is to 
the right of the mean), then it may actually help to have less noise. The overall direction of this 
parameter change is unclear. To see which restrictions are needed to provide a definitive, 
direction consider the entire expression:  
19 
 
	߲ܤ௡ ߲ߪఌ		ൗ ൌ
ଶ௘
షሺഁష೛ෝሻ
మ
మ഑ഄమ
షሺ೛ෝషഁሻ
మ
మ഑ഄమ ሺఉି௣ොሻఙഋమ
గఙഄమ൫௡ఙഋమାఙഄమ൯ሺଵାா௥௙൤೛ෝషഁ√మ഑ഄ൨ሻ
మ െ
ଶ௘
షሺ೛ෝషഁሻ
మ
మ഑ഄమ ටమഏఙഋమఙഄమ
൫௡ఙഋమାఙഄమ൯మሺଵାா௥௙൤೛ෝషഁ√మ഑ഄ൨ሻ
൅ ௘
షሺ೛ෝషഁሻ
మ
మ഑ഄమ ටమഏఙഋమ
൫௡ఙഋమାఙഄమ൯ሺଵାா௥௙൤೛ෝషഁ√మ഑ഄ൨ሻ
൅
																																																																										൅ ௘
షሺ೛ෝషഁሻ
మ
మ഑ഄమ ටమഏሺ௣ොିఉሻమఙഋమ
ఙഄమ൫௡ఙഋమାఙഄమ൯ሺଵାா௥௙൤೛ෝషഁ√మ഑ഄ൨ሻ
																																																			ሺ9) 
Severe truncation, while mathematically feasible, is not going to be considered in this model. I 
assume that ߚ ൏ 	݌	ෝ . A situation in which ߚ ൐ 	݌	ෝ  would imply an entrepreneur is observing an 
average firm and that this average firm is failing. This should mean that no one at all would enter. 
A closer look (see Appendix 1 for Proofs) reveals that ߚ ൏ ݌	ෝ  is not a sufficient condition for the 
overall effect to be positive. There is a necessary and sufficient condition (see Appendix 1) which 
ensures that the derivative is positive.  
	߲ܤ௡ ߪఌൗ ൐ 0										݂݅	ܽ݊݀	݋݈݊ݕ	݂݅																
ଶ௘
షሺഁష೛ෝሻ
మ
మ഑ഄమ ሺ௣ොିఉሻ
√ଶగሺଵିா௥௙ሺഁష೛ሻ෢√మ഑ഄሻ
൅	 ଶఙഄర௡ఙഋమାఙഄమ ൐ 	ߪఌ
ଶ ൅ ሺ݌̂ െ ߚሻଶ          (10) 
If (10) is satisfied, then as signals get noisier the overall bias will get worse. This comes from the 
fact that the difference between ̅ݏ and g(̅ݏሻ gets larger as ߪఌଶ gets larger. At the same time, the 
above condition (10) identifies a range of parameters for which this derivative is negative (if both 
inequalities are reversed). In this case an observer will place less weight on the signals 
(incomplete information, which is misleading) thus improving her posterior beliefs.  
 
iv) Variations in truncation point. 
If a truncation point is moved to the left, leading to better information, then it should be 
obvious that there should be less bias as a result. While it is true for the severe truncation case, it 
is not always the case for mild truncation (see Appendix 1). An additional condition is needed to 
insure that increases in truncation increase the bias; namely, 
	߲ܤ௡ ߚൗ ൏ 0													݂݅	ܽ݊݀	݋݈݊ݕ	݂݅											√2ߨ	ሺ݌̂ െ ߚሻ ቀ1 ൅ ܧݎ݂ ቂ
௣ොିఉ
√ଶఙഄቃቁ ൐ 2ߪఌ 	݁
ିሺഁష೛ෝሻమమ഑ഄమ       (11) 
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While these findings examine the bias and its properties, the factors that determine this 
truncation threshold for a particular industry remain outside of this framework. Nonetheless, these 
are very important. What determines the profits threshold necessary for a particular business? 
Why do these thresholds differ, and what does that mean for entrants? These questions are not 
addressed directly by the Bayesian mechanism of this model, but there are obvious determinants 
of the success thresholds for any particular business. These thresholds are higher for businesses 
where high entry fees need to be recouped.  Increasing the sunk costs of entry decreases the 
number of entrants. Thus the number of those entering erroneously decreases as well. They 
(agents who entered misguidedly) then exit upon the first profit realization. I take higher entry 
costs to mean that it takes larger profit estimates to fool agents into entry (because agents would 
expect to recoup these costs over time). A number of agents will enter, only to realize that their 
expectations were too high. But many will remain in business since entry costs become sunk costs 
after an entry decision is made. Not exiting and not recouping costs implies migrating to the left 
side of the profit distribution. We should observe lower rates of failure for high entry costs (such 
as buying capacity settings – cars, planes manufacturing) as well as for expensive red-tape 
businesses (nuclear energy, natural resource extraction). More importantly, this becomes a self-
sustaining mechanism; industries with low failure rates will continue to have low failure rates, 
and industries with high failure rates will sustain high failure rates. In case of the low entry costs 
industries, agents who drew low profits exit (unlike those in high sunk costs cases). 
Consequently, to the observer it seems that those remaining agents earn a good profit and this 
observation, paired with low costs of entry, should motivate a lot of entry and as a result more 
failure as well. These high failure rates will have a larger portion of industry hidden from some 
observers. This creates a large number of overly optimistic entrants; they enter the industry and 
fail, thus creating high failure rates. 
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Even though my model predicts this self-feeding mechanism for any given industry, there 
are changes in these thresholds for the number of industries (Dunne et al. 1989). Clearly, there are 
other mechanisms responsible for these changes. The case could be made for both inter and intra-
industry differences and changes in thresholds. Truncation points could change over time due to 
some exogenous factors such as foreign competition. If we were to examine an industry which 
has gone through a severe drop in profits (due to foreign competition) it should have higher 
standards for firms’ survival. Meaning, only the best would remain which would essentially 
create a new, higher truncation point. In such cases we should see a change in hazard rates as 
well. Immediately after a shake-out an observer will see fewer firms earning profits (keep in mind 
that an observer did not monitor the industry prior to shake-out). Fewer incumbent firms imply 
smaller samples from which estimation is done. Entering entrepreneurs are less misinformed 
compared to the same industry populated by more firms. Some examples of these types of 
industries include shoes, steel, knives, wood mills, fisheries, etc. Another factor that may change 
profit thresholds is some regulatory change which would make entry tougher or easier. Any of 
these exogenous shocks which change industry dynamics, profit levels, and fixed costs. These 
shocks will lead to new hazard rates. All of these should change failure rates by varying β in 
distribution of signals and thus affecting the degree of bias.  
These are all static comparisons, and saying what happens over time does not fit in well 
with the current set up of the model. In order to switch to a dynamic setting, we need an agent 
who can observe a change in the industry and/or who observes several periods (essentially 
updating her beliefs more than once). As a result of numerous instances of updating, she should 
be closer to the correct estimate. This is because she observes as a failure as well as success.  
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4. Dynamics and Empirical Suggestions 
This current setup is limited to a one-shot “update-and-decide model”. Even though 
agents have prior beliefs, and they update those beliefs upon collecting new information, there is 
nothing to suggest continuous updating. One natural extension is to see what the value of waiting 
is. I now proceed to extend the model in this direction. Let us consider the very same updating 
done over “t” periods. Simply, updated expectations for profit potential in period one becomes a 
prior belief in period two. This dynamic can be captured by the difference equations as follows: 
 
μ௧ାଵ ൌ
μ௧σఌଶ
σఓሺ௧ሻଶ ݊ ൅ σఌଶ
൅ σఓሺ௧ሻ
ଶ ݊̅ݏ
σఓሺ௧ሻଶ ݊ ൅ σఌଶ
																																																																																																									ሺ12ሻ 
and 
ߪ௧ାଵ ൌ
σఌଶσఓሺ௧ሻଶ
σఓሺ௧ሻଶ ൅ ݊σఌଶ
																																																																																																																																				ሺ13ሻ 
 
Note that in the above equations “t+1” subscripts denote posterior values and “t” 
subscripts denote prior values. The likelihood function, which includes the latest sample mean 
and variance, is free of time subscripts to avoid confusion. Thus, ̅ݏ captures an average value of 
signals from the newly collected sample in this current period. It is important to note that this 
sample contains the profits from all firms, including those that drew lower than expected profits 
and are exiting in the same period. One would expect that ̅ݏ	in the early periods of observation 
would contain incumbent firms as well as new entrants and new exits. As observation continues, 
prior beliefs become less biased and each successive posterior estimation improves in quality. 
Potential entrepreneurs can now see exiting firms by virtue of observing the industry dynamics 
given by (12) for numerous periods, without them having to enter. Observing numerous periods 
should improve an observer’s understanding of the true profit potential. It should be immediately 
clear that (13) contains only correct information and therefore will not be a source of bias. Recall 
that the variance of the prior is known to all agents and serves as a correct belief; henceforth, I 
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drop time subscripts on variances. Without loss of generality let us assume that the initial 
condition for (12) yields number one (it makes no difference, as long as any finite number is 
chosen). Thus, solving (12) yields a solution for some arbitrary period	߬: 
μఛ ൌ െ
̅ݏσఌଶ ቆ σఌ
ଶ
σఌଶ ൅ σఓଶ݊ቇ
ఛିଵ
ቆ1 െ ቆσఌ
ଶ ൅ σఓଶ݊
σఌଶ ቇ
ఛ
ቇ
σఌଶ ൅ σఓଶ݊ ൅ ቆ
σఌଶ
σఌଶ ൅ σఓଶ݊ቇ
ఛିଵ
																																												ሺ14ሻ 
One would expect bias to disappear in this case if observation continues infinitely. As our 
potential entrepreneur begins her observation in any period, she is initially misinformed. Her first 
estimate will be severely influenced by the fact that the industry has been around for some time in 
conjunction with the assumption that previous failures are not taken into consideration. But as she 
continues to monitor the industry, her estimates improve (since now complete dynamics are 
visible). Eventually, the updating process outweighs initial misinformation. There is new and 
complete information. Thus, if an agent begins her observation at any given period “s” and 
continues to update her beliefs as in (12), she is then updating her μ௦which is initially biased by 
observing	̅ݏ. Note, this average ̅ݏ is less biased after numerous periods and represents an average 
drawn from the complete signal distribution because all of the signals from the beginning of 
observation are now included. But will this bias be eliminated completely? Taking the limit of 
equation (14) yields: 
																																								limఛ→ஶ μఛ ൌ ̅ݏ.                
 
This is an intuitive result. It states that longer observation of an industry reduces bias. An 
agent observing the complete lifespan of an industry is not misinformed at all. This is an 
important point in and of itself. Consider the beginning of any industry: agents that entered have 
not been misled by years of failure. Agents that have started at time zero have no information to 
rely on. And, in this case this information is not misleading to early entrants. One must be careful 
about the term “early entrant”. The term “early entrant” could  mean two different things. First, 
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an early entrant is an agent who has entered an industry in the early stages of the industry’s 
lifecycle. Second, an early entrant is an agent who decided to wait less before to making an entry 
decision. This model states that the former would be less misinformed by definition while the 
latter is really misinformed. She can use some observing time to remedy the information driven 
bias (reduce the bias by observing the industry’s dynamics).        
The number of periods for which information is missing matters as well. An agent 
entering some industry in its infant stage does not have many firms that had previously exited. 
Take an extreme case where there are few firms in the industry and not one firm has failed in the 
previous few periods. An observer contemplating entry into this industry is not misinformed at 
all; in fact, she observes the entire profit distribution. Whereas an industry that has been able to 
weed out a number of firms over its lifetime potentially misleads an observer, suggesting that 
incumbent firms’ profits are representative of the whole population. In this case an agent can 
improve the quality of her expectations by observing several periods completely (failures 
included). 
 
i) Number of Signals 
I now turn my attention to other possible changes that may take place over time. I first 
consider changes in the number of incumbent firms. The number of signals could either change 
over time due to some exogenous factors or as a result of internal entry and failure dynamics. 
Exogenously dictated differences are, for example, those industries which have different sizes and 
thus different number of signals ex ante. These industries can be compared to one another. 
Alternatively, the number of signals could change with time due to some outside factors. 
Resulting differences in the number of incumbent firms will change hazard rates from one 
industry to the next based on different n. In the case where the number of signals increases due to 
the internal dynamics of an industry, it has to be driven by larger number of firms drawing profits 
25 
 
above the exit threshold, put it more simply, there is a decrease in failure rates. At the minimum, 
this should imply that the profit distribution’s left tail is being pulled in (same result could be due 
to the whole distribution stretching up, and pulling both tails in), in which case less distributional 
mass falls below the exit threshold. We should see less profit variance in this type industry and 
more firms similar to one another. The whole industry should begin to look more homogeneous, 
with fewer small firms and fewer large firms in term of profits. This intuition could only be used 
if the overall profit distribution is unchanged otherwise (i.e., profits for the industry and entry 
rates will remain fixed). If, however, there is something else going on which effects the shape or 
the size of a profit distribution (i.e. changes in entry and exit rate or movement within 
distribution) the above conclusions cannot be reached. For example, in a growing industry an 
increasing number of signals could be the outcome of expansion. In this case, not much could be 
predicted about changes in distribution. In the case of a declining industry, changes in the 
distribution of profits are also an outcome of incumbent firms capturing the market share of 
exiting firms. So it is difficult to analyze these dynamics since for most industries the life cycle 
tends to be increasing at first and declining thereafter (Horvath et al 2001, Klepper and Simons 
1993). It is then likely that some exogenous factors are responsible for this single-peak evolution 
process. 
A more interesting case to consider is that of industries which are different in size due to 
market demand. Larger industries (in terms of number of firms) should have more misinformed 
entrants when compared to smaller industries. This scenario holds true for industries with low or 
no entry costs and should be especially true for industries populated by small firms. Smaller firms 
tend to be self-funded. Therefore, entry choices are made by an entrepreneur based on search 
rather than by capital providers like venture capitalists or banks based on their assessment. 
Differences can arise from the fact that a person contemplating entry collects information from 
existing firms and updates her beliefs in Bayesian fashion. Thus, the number of signals matters. 
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Consequently, in the case of banks and venture capitalists they (capital providers) have their own 
information and their own criteria for funding. A search conducted by an entrepreneur matters 
less. Banks and venture capitalists have their own assessment formulas and techniques based on a 
much wider sample. Banks and venture capitalists have been observing an industry for much 
longer than any potential entrepreneur. Hence, having this larger quantity of signals drawn from 
truncated distribution will create a more biased posterior belief about potential profitability of a 
future venture. At first glance, the current evidence (correlating the number of firms to hazard 
rates) does not support this intuition (comparison was made based on Baldwin et al. 2000 study). 
Perhaps this suggests that a search is more local and would not be reflected in nationwide 
statistics about the size of an industry. Maybe more controls would need to be implemented 
(concentration ratios, industry life cycles, and macroeconomic variables). Obviously, clustering 
effects and geographical distribution will vary greatly depending on an industry. A look into a 
local population (city and metro areas) could be a more informational examination of this theory. 
Study examining search before entry do indeed point to a more local search (Cooper et al. 1995). 
 
ii) Variances 
Changes in variances also have interesting effects on posterior beliefs. Altering either one 
or both the variance of the prior beliefs or the variance of new signals being collected will result 
in changes to posterior expectations. Over time increases in the prior’s  variance means that new 
information from one period to the next is diminishing in quality (since a posterior in period one 
becomes a prior in period two). The prior variance is the “correct” information in the sense that it 
is made up of unbiased beliefs about the true population and of all the information gathered from 
observing a certain number of time periods completely (an observer must have seen a full 
population of signals since the initiation of industry observation). These complete observations 
include profits of all successful and failed firms from the beginning of observation. Increases in 
27 
 
this variance means that this correct information has decreased in quality and, as a result, it will 
be trusted less. An important conclusion is that earlier entrants (in the sense of entering in the 
early days of an industry) are misinformed less. Thus, there should be more successes among 
them. This model does not produce mechanisms which would be responsible for this change in 
variances; these mechanisms are responsible for a lot of industry dynamics and need to be 
investigated. Nonetheless, even if one was to take these changes as completely exogenous and 
apply it to this model, hazard rates will change. This can be empirically tested by a close 
examination of the particular profit distributions. 
Literature on the life cycles of an industry has been pointing to the fact that many 
industries evolve in a single peak fashion, with the number of firms and profits initially going up 
and then steadily declining over time (Horvath et al 2001, Klepper & Simons 1993).  Klepper and 
Simons (1993) also show early entrants to be more successful when compared to the later ones. 
And finally, the literature points to industry concentration decreasing during the period of growth, 
and increasing in decline period (Horvath et al 2001, Klepper and Simons 1993). This is 
consistent with my model’s predictions about failure in conjunction with changes in prior 
variance. As prior information decreases in quality (precision drops), more misinformed agents 
enter and immediately fail. Incumbents then get the market share of the exiting firms. Clustering 
and geography may once again prove to be of importance here. As an industry grows (both 
geographically and in product variety), it is harder to keep track of all of the relevant information 
out there (since search is found to be local by Cooper et al 1995). This implies the quality of prior 
beliefs decreases.  
Increasing the new signal’s variance is a more helpful method of reducing the bias. 
Agents collecting and analyzing signals will trust (put less weight) on this “incorrect” (incorrect 
in the sense that the bias arises from the fact that it is not complete) information consequently 
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reducing the bias. In this case earlier (in terms of industry’s age) entrants will have lower failure 
rates compared to the late ones because of more unobserved failures over time. 
Another interesting story is the interaction of the two variances. For example, if both are 
increasing but the variance from new signals increases faster (the variance of prior information 
need not be increasing at all), then it could lead to a situation similar to the observed industry’s 
life cycle. More specifically a shakeout will occur as the weights of variances switch rankings. 
Incorrect information enters into a decision making process as a more important component; later, 
the “correct” information takes over as a more important factor leading to a decrease in entry. The 
results from one industry to the next will vary because of different fixed entry costs, but as long 
as there are some entry costs a number of agents will mistakenly enter (hoping to regain fixed 
costs over time); these agents stay even though the costs cannot be recouped, but they move to the 
lower tail of the profit distribution. Recall, in the case of no entry costs, agents just stay or exit as 
soon as profits are revealed. So compared to the no entry costs case, a different fraction of 
entering agents will immediately exit. For that reason, fixed costs will also have a significant role 
in determining hazard rates in any particular industry. 
 
5. Conclusion  
    My model shows how seemingly irrational behavior of new entrants can be explained by a lack 
of complete information. The overestimation of future earnings potential and subsequent over 
entry is driven by the assumption that income information containing profit levels of firms who 
have gone under is not accessible. Whenever an observer contemplating entry is not aware of the 
limited nature of information, she would be bound to overinflate her estimate of earnings 
potential. This result arises even though the entrant has a correct prior belief. This correct 
information gets distorted during Bayesian updating, involving an analysis of incomplete 
information. I also find that increasing the number of signals during sampling is likely to make 
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the resulting bias worse. On the other hand, collecting information about the entire profit 
population (observing for several periods prior to entry) helps to reduce bias. For any agent 
having more precise information about prior beliefs helps, while having more precise information 
about current profit distributions is likely to make the bias larger. Dynamic changes in system 
parameters such as the variances of prior and/or signal distributions, and the number of 
incumbents produce results which may explain life cycles of an industry as well as the different 
hazard rates observed. Empirical verification is needed where the hazard rate would serve as a 
dependent variable. The lifespan of an industry, number of incumbents, and quality of 
information should serve as independent variables. This paper serves as a pilot investigation into 
the role of information for the study of entrepreneurship. 
Information plays a vital role in any kind of decision-making process and it cannot be 
neglected. If we assume that entrepreneurship is a resource which needs to be supported, then 
policymakers need to aid business owners’ to maximize their success. This paper suggests that 
potential entrepreneurs need to be better informed about their true chances of success. Business 
school provides an excellent example: most case studies examine successful firms, successful 
entrepreneurs, and choices that proved to be successful; it may therefore create a false picture of 
business potential. Some of these “educated” students go on to open their own companies. Beliefs 
about profit potentials are heavily distorted by these few superstar entrepreneurs (Bill Gates, 
Warren Buffet and the like); this implies that even estimates of average chances for success may 
not be the best prior belief. The same logic applies to high school sports, where many students 
count on becoming professional athletes. Lending institutions chose to fund an entrepreneur or 
not. A person who does not get a loan attributes her failure to the lender’s lack of faith in her 
success. Better informed people contemplating startups at and before the lending stage (regardless 
of loan approval), will produce more optimal talent allocation and fewer bias driven failures. This 
does not imply that everyone wishing to open their own companies is capable of doing so. This 
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model can and should be extended in both a theoretical direction and verified empirically. An 
investigation incorporating Bayesian updating, limited information and entrepreneurial entry 
decision with the general equilibrium model is a natural extension of this research. Adding 
strategic interactions, where agent can misinform each other to deter entry, as well as a set up 
where repeated entrepreneurs are possible and different agents will sell businesses to one another 
because of different expectations are also useful avenues for further investigation. 
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III.  How risky is business ownership?  
 
1.  Introduction. 
 
The failure of countless many suggests that business ownership is a risky undertaking and 
the extent of the risks faced by entrepreneurs is the subject of this paper. While company workers 
can face termination risk incurring lost wages (and, perhaps, partially vested 401k company 
contributions), the closing of a business potentially induces much bigger losses for the 
entrepreneur. Entrepreneurship has always been associated with risk,2 but do entrepreneurs enjoy 
risk or do they tolerate it in exchange for larger expected payoffs?  
Kihlstrom and Laffont’s (1979) seminal model, in which risk preference plays an 
important role in agent’s choices between entrepreneurship and wage employment, motivated a 
number of empirical studies evaluating the risk-return tradeoff for entrepreneurs. These studies 
have not arrived at a consensus of an opinion. Some studies (e.g., Rosen and Willen, 2002; 
Quadrini, 2005; Gort and Lee, 2007) provide evidence that expected entrepreneurial earnings 
exceed  those of wage earners with similar characteristics, which is consistent with a standard 
story of risk-averse entrepreneurs obtaining higher expected returns in exchange for greater risk. 
Others (e.g., Hamilton, 2000; Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002) find lower mean or 
median earnings for entrepreneurs, leading us either to invoke a preference for risk or the 
existence of nonpecuniary benefits obtained from business creation.  
A number of reasons – including income definitions, sample definitions, and duration—
are collectively responsible for these diverse findings. For example, Gort and Lee’s finding of a 
premium to entrepreneurship is based on the SESTAT data, a notably high-tech and high-income 
sample of employees and entrepreneurs; in contrast, Hamilton’s results are based on the SIPP, a 
                                                 
2 Interestingly, the early meaning of ‘entrepreneurship’ had nothing to do with business or self-
employment, and referred instead to risky behavior in general. For example, Lemaire de Belges (1510) 
described the Trojans as entrepreneurs. Only later did the definition narrow to refer only to risk takers 
associated with business creation and ownership (Cantillon, 1755; and famously Knight, 1921). 
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relatively low-income sample. Rosen and Willen (2002) also establish their standard mean-
variance tradeoff  in earnings data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), but they 
restrict their entrepreneurial sample to individuals that have continued in self-employment for at 
least three years (i.e., those that are more successful than average). In stark contrast, Moskowitz 
and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002)’s conclusions derived from an analysis of the returns to investment 
portfolios. Even within samples, the reported return to entrepreneurship appears to vary. 
Hamilton’s conclusions also depend on how self-employment income is measured: for example, 
only two of his three measures yield a mean less than the average wage. Like Gort and Lee, 
Braguinsky and Ohyama (2007),  study SESTAT data; but in contrast to Gort and Lee, they find 
that, while the mean return to self-employment is strongly positive in skill-concentrated 
occupations, it is strongly negative in occupations that require only general skills.   
This paper contributes to our understanding of the risk and return to entrepreneurship by 
studying  individual income transitions along with transitions into and out of self-employment. 
My paper is of course not the first to estimate income transitions in this context: Quadrini (1999) 
and Bradford (2003) calculated transition matrices for two- and three-period income transitions, 
from which they found that persistence in entrepreneurship is correlated with higher earnings. 
Unfortunately, their dynamics provide only limited insight into the effect of entrepreneurship on 
lifetime earnings, since they are based on only one- or two-step long-term transitions. This paper 
extends their approach with a closer examination of transitions over 84 high-frequency time 
periods. 
My paper offers a new perspective on risk. By analyzing a large national dataset I am 
able to follow thousands of individuals over a period of seven years and compare business owners 
to wage earners. I not only estimate and track over time unconditional means and income 
distributions, I track individual earnings mobility though five distinct quintile earnings classes. I 
also characterize the process governing transitions from one period to the next, which allows me 
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to estimate transition probabilities reliably. I find that average entrepreneurial earnings dominate 
those of wage earners. However, the higher average earnings of entrepreneurs are skewed by a 
few very successful individuals at the top of the distribution: the median entrepreneur is strictly 
worse off monetarily compared to wage earners.  
Since returns to entrepreneurship likely increase with persistence, I undertake a dynamic 
analysis of income to see if the entrepreneurship income penalty evident in the short and medium 
terms can be recovered in the long run. The transitions from one period to the next are stationary 
and have the Markov property. The estimated Markov transition matrices are therefore invertible, 
enabling me to obtain empirical estimates of the ergodic distribution of earnings. Contingent on 
keeping one’s business, entrepreneurs are strictly better off than those staying in the wage sector. 
However, few entrepreneurs manage to survive. Entrepreneurs who return to the wage sector turn 
out to face very uncertain outcomes, and may do markedly worse or markedly better than those 
who remained as wage workers all the time. On average, however, a period of entrepreneurship 
followed by a return to wage work reduces earnings. Business ownership is relatively risky, and 
business failure is costly.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, I describe the data and 
note some limitations; in Section 3, I describe my findings; and in Section 4 I offer some 
conclusions.   
 
2.    The Data 
I use the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), a large national panel 
survey that was created in the late 1970’s by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
(DHEW).  Early panels contained overlapping waves of 20,000 households with a new panel 
beginning each year. The survey was redesigned in 1996, widening the survey to include non-
overlapping panels of 37,000 households initially, with the first panel running for 4 years and 
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every subsequent panel running for 3 years. Some other major changes introduced in 1996 were: 
an expansion of the scope of information collected, improved imputation procedures, and 
computer-assisted interviewing. These changes enhanced longitudinal consistency and widened 
the scope and quality of the information collected.   
The most attractive feature of SIPP is that it is a large panel dataset focused primarily on 
earnings.  There are several other large national surveys with earnings data, such as the Current 
Population Survey (CPS), the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), and the Kauffman Firm 
Survey (KFS), but for my purposes the SIPP has several advantages over them. First, the KFS 
only surveys businesses, making it inappropriate for this paper. The CPS is a repeated cross-
sectional survey of households, so changes in income for individuals and assets cannot be 
observed over time. The PSID is a large household survey (approximately 9,000 households) that 
conducts annual interviews, whereas the SIPP conducts interviews every four month to estimate 
monthly data;, and has a more detailed inquiry into assets and business variables of the 
households. Indeed, one of the biggest strengths of the SIPP is that it collects very detailed high-
frequency information pertaining to income, assets and wealth of individuals, families and 
households. The importance of different assets and especially different income categories cannot 
be understated. Income can be examined in detail to observe where the earnings come from (this 
is especially valuable when examining business income and how it translates into business 
owners’ incomes). The SIPP includes detailed information on many income categories such as 
wage income, business income, real estate, and financial assets income. This ensures that 
business earnings, oftentimes not reported in traditional earnings categories, are not understated.  
I combine the 1996 and 2001 panels resulting in seven years of monthly data. The 1996 
panel contains twelve waves, while the 2001 panel has nine. I also create an individual level 
dataset by combining household IDs (sample identifiers) with the IDs of individuals in each of 
the households, allowing me to go inside the household to make individual and subfamily 
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earnings comparisons. I replicated the analysis for the households, families, sub-families, and 
individuals. Since the results were almost identical, this paper reports earnings dynamics at the 
level of the individual.  
I restrict my sample to working-age men (18-65) in non-farm sectors.3 Women were 
excluded from the sample because their labor force participation rates and incomes are often 
family dependent. I further restrict the sample to people who remained active in the survey 
throughout the periods covered by both the 1996 and the 2001 panels. Finally, I eliminate the 
non-response survey subjects, as well as subjects whose income information was missing or 
incomplete for more than two  periods. The final sample consists of 14,381 men interviewed over 
84 months. Around nine percent of the sample were business owners at some point during the 
observation period.  
In order to estimate individual income transitions, I group income into 5 quintiles. 
Additionally, I created a binary variable for business ownership, where a value of 1 was assigned 
to a person who owns at least one business and 0 to everyone who does not own a business. I also 
created variables indicating which month of the survey a business was opened, and variables that 
capture time, length, and the number of times any person occupied any given quintile. Using 
these variables I am able to track movements of individuals among quintiles while relating these 
movements to changes in business ownership status. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 I exclude farmers for two reasons. First, farm ownership is likely driven by quite different dynamics than 
non-farm business ownership. Second, the earnings of farmers are often heavily dependent on government 
transfers, which is not a desirable feature in earnings comparisons.  
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3.    Earning Transitions in the Short and Long Run 
3.1    Earning Distributions  
Figure 1 plots the mean earnings in each sample period for business owners and wage 
earners. Consistent with the findings of Quadrini (1999), average earnings of business owners 
consistently exceed those of wage earners.4 In results not reported here, similar differences were 
found also at the household and family levels, while at the subfamily level the difference was not 
statistically significant.  
Figure 1. Individual Income Comparison Wage Workers to Business Owners  
 
Such raw comparisons, of course, tell us little about the expected return to 
entrepreneurship for an individual. Indeed, in stark contrast to Quadrini, Hamilton has found that 
after conditioning on observable attributes, the earnings of the self-employed are generally lower 
                                                 
4 A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test confirms that earnings of business owners are significantly different from 
those of wage earners. 
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than the earnings of wage workers. Moreover, as Figure 2 indicates, the higher mean earnings for 
business earnings are largely driven by the high earnings of a small minority of presumably 
unusually successful entrepreneurs.  
 
Figure 2. Earning Densities for Business Owners and Wage Workers 
 
Following Hamilton, I am interested in earnings expectations at the individual level. 
While Hamilton compared the earnings of business owners with their observationally-equivalent 
wage earning counterparts, I take the rather different approach of estimating individual earning 
transitions. 
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3.2    Income Transitions and Trends at High Frequency 
To capture the dynamics of income transitions I discretize income into quintiles obtained 
from the income distribution of all observations. I create these categories for each of the 84 
months in the sample. Consequently there are 83 transitions for each individual in the sample, 
although not all of the individuals have complete monthly income data. There are five income 
classes and two employment types. I will therefore estimate a single 10×10 transition matrix, 
which I will call the unconditional matrix; this matrix provides the rates of transitions between 
each earnings quintile × employment type. I estimate separately four 5×5 transition matrices, one 
for each of: agents who are business owners across both periods, agents who are wage workers in 
both periods, agents who switch from wage work to business ownership, and agents who switch 
from business ownership to wage work. I will refer to these four matrices as the set of conditional 
matrices.  
Transition probabilities need to have the Markov property in order for us to obtain 
meaningful estimates from panel data. However, missing values limit my ability to test for unit-
roots, and only two panel data procedures, Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) (Im, Pesaran et al. 2003) and 
Fisher-type (Choi 2001) tests, are available. Both tests rely on asymptotic assumptions and are 
justified as	ܶ → ∞, but this is reasonable given our long panel of 84 periods. The details of both 
tests are given, along with the results, in Appendix 2.A. Both tests yield results consistent 
stationarity in the transition probabilities. 
Table 1 provides estimates of the mean unconditional monthly transition rates, while the 
four conditional transition matrices are given in Table 2. To highlight the conditionality of Table 
2, the four matrices have been separated by gray borders.5 I estimate Markov probabilities 
corresponding to a transition process from one period to the next.  I combine Markov transition 
                                                 
5 These are not, of course, separate estimates. It is in fact easy to derive the four sub-matrices in Table 2 
from the numbers in Table 1. 
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probabilities into one 10x10 matrix (Table 1). The estimated probabilities represent estimates for 
any person in the sample transitioning from one period to the next. I also estimated the 
confidence intervals for these conditional transitions; those are given in Appendix 2.B.  
Consider first the unconditional transitions. To interpret Table 1, consider the upper row, 
which reports the transitions of individuals that in the current period are business owners in the 
lowest income quintile. Some 75.1 percent of these individuals remain as business earners in the 
same earnings category a month later, while 0.58 percent remain in the lowest earnings quintile 
same. Summing the two numbers, I find that 75.7 percent of these agents remain in the same 
earnings quintile. Summing the numbers in columns 6 through 10, I find that 2.45 percent of 
business owners in the lowest earnings quintile had returned to wage work the next month. The 
numbers are similar for each of the five initial earnings categories 
The rate of exit from business ownership is much greater than the rate of entry into 
business ownership. For example, only 0.23 percent of low-income wage workers switched to 
business ownership the following month. This is as expected in a stationary environment, because 
wage employment is much more common than business ownership. To see this, let p be the 
proportion of low-income agents that are wage workers. Then, if flows into and out of business 
ownership are equal, it must be the case that 0.23p = 2.45(1-p). This requires that p=0.91, or that 
the incidence of entrepreneurship among this income group is about nine percent; this number is 
about right.  
Although the majority of agents remain in the same income group, Table 1 also reveals a 
considerable amount of volatility. At first, this month-to-month earnings volatility may seem high 
(especially when looking at the wage earners); however, several explanations and similar findings 
point to these estimates as both reasonable and in line with related prior research. Although 
earnings volatility studies using the methods used in this study have not been done before, there 
are several, more general, earnings volatility studies completed recently. Using the same data 
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over a longer time period and employing slightly different sample selection criteria the Urban 
Institute has recently published a study aiming explicitly at measuring income volatility and 
changed to income volatility over time (Acs, Loprest, and Nichols 2009). Researchers find similar 
magnitudes of earnings volatility for American households. In another recent investigation the 
U.S. Congress has commissioned a similar study into changes of earning volatility. The work, 
completed in 2007 by the Congressional Budget Office, also found similar earnings volatility 
using the Continuous Work History Sample (CWHS) dataset. One notable disagreement between 
these two works is that the former finds a gradual increase over time in earnings volatility while 
the latter does not. More importantly, both reports find volatility similar to that described in this 
paper. Different long run volatility trends found by the two papers arise from different samples, 
methodology and time length of the surveys.  
There are at least three reasons for this observed high earnings volatility: First, bi-weekly 
pay systems create irregularities in monthly income recording. Simply put, dividing 26 time 
periods between 12 months is usually done without splitting any of the pay periods to equalize 
monthly payments. This, of course, creates two months with three paychecks rather than two – 
thus contributing to some of the observed volatility. A second reason for the volatility is the recall 
error of the respondents resulting from them having to recall information from the previous four 
months to report monthly observations. This is also known as the “seam bias”, where respondents 
are more likely to assign an event to the first time period rather than any other (see, for example 
Hill 1987). Lastly, there are entire industries for which volatility is driven by seasonal demand 
fluctuations. For people occupied in tourism, services, retail, real estate etc. earnings vary greatly 
between months within the high demand season and other times. Often, there are small mini-
seasons such as winter holidays and the spring break. For people employed in sectors sensitive to 
severe swings in demand, earnings will vary greatly for both the self-employed and wage earners.  
41 
 
Bi-weekly pay is the most likely of the three phenomena to affect self-employed and 
wage workers differently. At the same time it is hard to make any conjectures without asking 
respondents explicitly what kinds of wage scheme workers employ vs. what kind of earnings 
disbursement scheme is implemented by business owners. Income misreporting is also to blame 
for some inconsistencies. Additionally, there are life events such as college graduation, disability, 
bonuses, unpaid family leave, alimony etc. which change possible earnings. These events 
influencing earnings’ volatility are not measured well in the SIPP; however, there is no reason to 
suspect them of causing systematic biases: wage workers and entrepreneurs are all subject to 
those events. Hence, it is reasonable to proceed with wage worker – business owner earnings 
comparison.  
Table 1 suppresses an especially important aspect of earnings volatility that is made clear 
in Table 2. The likelihood of staying in the same income category from one period to the next is 
much higher for people who either stayed in the same job or continued with business ownership. 
Changing occupational type induces large probabilities of moving up and down one or more 
income categories. Uncertainty associated with the career changes is clearly reflected in the top 
right and bottom left panels of the tables. Consider a simple metric, by which an event with over 
fifty percent probability of being realized is considered likely and an event with less than fifty 
percent probability is termed unlikely. Using this metric, it is clear that for people continuing in 
their respective employment type (i.e., wage or business ownership) remaining in the same 
income category is likely for all income quintiles, whereas people switching between wage work 
and business ownership (in either direction) are more likely to move to other quintiles of the 
income distribution. However, the conditional matrices in Table 2 reveal that even continuing in 
wage or self-employment is associated with considerable earnings volatility. The findings in 
Tables 1 and 2 are in line with those from similar studies (Acs, Loprest, and Nichols 2009; 
Congressional Budget Office 2007).  
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Table 1. Unconditional Transition Rates 
 Business Owners (t+1) Wage Earners (t+1) 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
B
us
in
es
s O
w
ne
rs
 (t
) 
1 75.09 10.17 4.31 3.34 4.66 0.58 0.43 0.35 0.39 0.70 
2 8.93 70.84 10.48 3.67 3.38 0.49 0.65 0.49 0.37 0.69 
3 4.20 9.60 68.43 10.84 4.45 0.54 0.54 0.50 0.58 0.33 
4 3.23 2.70 8.51 70.47 12.39 0.49 0.42 0.68 0.68 0.42 
5 2.43 1.56 2.97 6.39 83.95 0.44 0.39 0.56 0.68 0.63 
W
ag
e 
Ea
rn
er
s (
t) 
1 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.08 61.06 12.12 8.99 8.68 8.93 
2 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05 10.62 57.23 14.46 8.97 8.57 
3 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.08 7.88 14.11 52.55 16.56 8.72 
4 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.06 7.58 8.34 15.57 53.01 15.33 
5 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.07 7.54 7.82 8.10 14.88 61.47 
 
Table 2. Conditional Transition Rates 
 Business Owners (t+1)  Wage Earners (t+1) 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
B
us
in
es
s O
w
ne
rs
 (t
) 
1 76.97 10.42 4.42 3.42 4.77 23.81 17.46 14.29 15.87 28.57 
2 9.18 72.80 10.77 3.77 3.48 18.18 24.24 18.18 13.64 25.76 
3 4.30 9.84 70.17 11.12 4.56 21.67 21.67 23.33 23.33 13.33 
4 3.32 2.77 8.75 72.42 12.73 18.31 15.49 25.35 25.35 15.49 
5 2.50 1.60 3.05 6.57 86.28 16.22 14.41 20.72 25.23 23.42 
 
W
ag
e 
Ea
rn
er
s (
t) 
1 16.67 7.14 19.05 22.62 34.52  61.19 12.14 9.01 8.70 8.95 
2 9.84 13.11 18.03 22.95 36.07 10.63 57.32 14.48 8.99 8.59 
3 15.58 11.69 12.99 18.18 41.56 7.90 14.13 52.64 16.59 8.74 
4 16.67 20.51 8.97 21.79 32.05 7.60 8.36 15.59 53.10 15.35 
5 14.61 13.48 14.61 23.60 33.71 7.55 7.83 20.02 14.91 61.60 
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Agents who did not experience an occupational change have the most income stability 
and, among them, agents in the top and bottom quintiles are the most stable. For agents 
transitioning into business, the likelihood of moving into the top quintile is fairly large (over 30 
percent for all quintiles). The same odds do not apply for agents going back into the wage sector. 
Agents finding out that business ownership is not for everyone are more likely to experience a 
less favorable outcome when going back into the wage sector. This can be deemed a short run 
cost of business failure, and may arise because of, inter alia, gaps in the resume created by non-
verifiable self-employment and the stigma of failure caused by closure of one’s business. For 
business owners, the odds of going into the top quintile are best for agents from the lower two 
and top quintiles of the income distribution. It is no surprise that people from the top quintile in 
one category would transition into a top quintile of another group. -- these are most likely high-
end entrepreneurs. But observing people from the lowest quintiles moving up in income is 
surprising. This finding suggests that, perhaps, some valuable experience is gained by agents in 
the two lower income groups while they are self-employed allowing them to perform better upon 
their return to the wage sector. Alternatively, these could have been people with well-paid jobs 
who thought they can do better on their own, only to find out otherwise and who are now going 
back to their jobs. Despite good outcomes for some people , going back into the wage sector is on 
average costly when compared to the odds of higher earnings faced by wage workers.  
Monthly transitions provide a useful insight into earnings fluctuations, especially when 
occupational transitions are involved, as they produce estimates of immediate welfare changes for 
the individuals. Clearly, choosing to start a business is associated with better immediate odds of 
improving one’s earnings than is transition in opposite direction. This is expected, because as at 
least a portion of the transitions back into wage employment is an outcome of business failure. 
However, as these estimates are subject to distortions resulting from seasonal fluctuations, “seam 
bias” and bi-weekly payment schemes, they should be interpreted cautiously. Nonetheless, as 
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these three distortions apply to business owners and wage workers alike, comparisons between 
the two groups are warranted.  
Nonetheless, I attempt to reduce the magnitude of these biases and check robustness of 
these findings by aggregating observation periods into a longer time periods. Aggregating into an 
annual observation is difficult as the partial non-response for many agents in a given year reduces 
the number of observations significantly. Annual income is not reported in this survey and has to 
be aggregated from the monthly interview data. Aggregating income into annual data would only 
be meaningful for agents present for all the interviews in a given year. All others would have to 
be dropped, severely reducing the size of the sample. Non-response is nonrandom and, as such, it 
would increase the attrition bias. Individuals experiencing income drops are more likely to leave 
the panel (Acs, Loprest, and Nichols 2009). To avoid issues of increased attrition associated with 
the annual data, I choose to examine four-month intervals. Four-month intervals are the most 
attractive because the interviews take place every four months. Thus, every respondent 
interviewed is asked about four months of data and if there is no response it is the case for all four 
months. Using the four month income data will reduce the “seem bias” the most. I report 
transitions using wave-to-wave (four months) data.  
 
3.3    Income Transitions and Trends at Four-Month Frequency  
 
I repeated the analysis after replacing the monthly transition rates with four-monthly 
(hereafter 4M) transition rates and monthly income with 4M income. The data are constructed by 
taking eight sequential monthly observations. The monthly income data reported each quarter are 
summed for the each quarter. Summed values give rise to new 4M income distributions. I split 
these new distributions into five quintiles for each 4M period, analogs to the monthly analysis. 
The resulting data are the twenty-one 4M income distributions split into five income quintiles. 
Agents for whom 4M data is incomplete are dropped from the analysis since including them 
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would give rise to erroneous income data. Transitions into and out of business are recorded as 
agents report their employment status for each 4M period. Because interviews take place every 
four months, the vast majority of agents report the same status for the entire 4M period. For 
agents reporting changes in business ownership status, I use last month of the 4M period as an 
indicator of their business status. I report resulting 4M transition estimates in Tables 3 and 4, 
below. As another robustness check, I run the same unit root tests for 4M transitions. 
Unsurprisingly, I do not detect an autoregressive component in transitions. 
 
Table 3. 4M Unconditional Transition Rates 
 Business Owners (t+1) Wage Earners (t+1) 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
B
us
in
es
s O
w
ne
rs
 (t
) 
1 8.64 0.65 0.78   1.56 1.10 18.18  18.44 17.01 17.08 16.56 
2 0.46 5.10 0.59 1.27 1.27 13.03 20.50 20.16 18.94 18.68 
3 0.38 0.87 5.87 1.19 1.61 13.97 17.64 19.91 18.79 19.77 
4 0.51 0.72 1.02 6.39 1.83 13.03 19.51 19.72 19.00 18.25 
5 0.55 0.74 1.06 1.19 6.90 13.28 18.00 20.97 18.47 18.85 
W
ag
e 
Ea
rn
er
s (
t) 
1 0.41 0.55 0.67 0.73 1.09 50.33 11.71 11.92 11.38 11.21 
2 0.55 0.88 1.01 1.16 1.66 13.86 19.66 20.64 20.63 19.94 
3 0.46 0.87 0.98 1.14 1.74 12.90 19.64 21.17 21.03 20.06 
4 0.43 0.87 1.07 1.22 1.72 12.78 19.62 21.19 20.88 20.20 
5 0.51 0.90 1.09 1.30 1.75 12.66 19.24 20.60 21.08 20.88 
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Table 4. 4M Conditional Transition Rates 
 Business Owners (t+1)  Wage Earners (t+1) 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
B
us
in
es
s O
w
ne
rs
 (t
) 
1 67.86 5.10 6.12 12.24 8.67 6.45 22.58 22.58 25.81 22.58 
2 5.34 58.74 6.80 14.56 14.56 22.22 22.22 19.44 16.67 19.44 
3 3.87 8.80 59.15 11.97 16.20 18.75 25.00 34.38 9.38 12.50 
4 4.87 6.88 9.74 61.03 17.48 33.33 15.15 18.18 15.15 18.18 
5 5.27 7.10 10.14 11.36 66.13 22.22 0 33.33 25.93 18.52 
 
W
ag
e 
Ea
rn
er
s (
t) 
1 20.00 20.00 4.00 28.00 28.00  52.13 12.13 12.34 11.78 11.61 
2 41.67 8.33 12.50 16.67 20.83 14.63 20.75 21.79 21.78 21.05 
3 25.00 13.89 11.11 16.67 33.33 13.61 20.72 22.33 22.18 21.16 
4 31.58 15.79 26.32 10.53 15.79 13.50 20.73 22.38 22.06 21.33 
5 21.05 23.68 21.05 10.53 23.68 13.41 20.37 21.81 22.32 22.10 
 
There is an especially striking contrast between Tables 1 and 3. The probabilities of 
staying in business after four months drop significantly. This is a very telling result as it points to 
some other factor – not captured here. I investigate the average time span and individuals spends 
in a particular quintile (not reported here) and find wage earners spend more than double the time 
in each income category when compared to business owners. This is to be expected, as many 
more business owners survive two months as compared to those with over four months of 
business tenure, leading them to move about the income distribution. Reasons for the short 
business tenure could be numerous, among which expectations mismatch is probably the most 
important factor. These erroneous expectations could be a mix of earnings and costs 
misjudgments leading to an early exit. As a result of this phenomenon business owners are likely 
to transition quickly back into wage employment. For business owners in the lowest tail of the 
income distribution, the transition back into wage work is likely to be into the two lowest income 
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quintiles. Business owners transitioning from the second and third quintiles are more likely to see 
a small improvement, reflected in improved odds of upward income mobility. Business owners 
from the top two quintiles are more or less equally likely to end up in any of the top four 
quintiles. Wage workers in the lowest quintile of income distributions are the worst off, as their 
chances of staying in the lowest quintile are highest. For wage workers in top four quintiles, there 
is more mobility and the chances of moving to any other one of the top four quintiles are about 
equal. It is also clear that business owners from the lowest quintile fare better than their wage 
counterparts from the same. In other words, if entry costs are not too high, undertaking business 
ownership is not a bad idea, especially for wage workers in the two lowest income categories.  
Table 4 is similar to Table 2, although there are some differences of note. In terms of 
similarities, it is clear that surviving businesses are relatively stable in both tables. The biggest 
difference is how unstable income is for wage workers. Unlike the month-to-month transitions, 
wave-to-wave transitions show a lot more volatility for wage workers. The only stable income 
category for the wage worker is the lowest quintile of the distribution where agents are more 
likely to stay rather than transition to another quintile. For the remaining top four quintiles wage 
workers face about the same odds of moving to any one of the top four quintiles. Previously 
mentioned biases are applicable here as well, with perhaps the exception of the “seam bias.” At 
the same time, eight-month periods are more likely to be affected by job changes, bonuses, 
unpaid leaves and other events of a similar nature when compared to the two-month time spell. 
This is not the case for business owners as they cannot leave their businesses and can enjoy 
bonuses as part of earnings on continuous bases.  
Earnings, conditioning on the survival of the business, are more stable in the business 
sector. This is not surprising because of going back to wage work is generally associated with 
poor performance of the business. Hence, business owners who are doing well, reflected by their 
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choice to remain in business, face better odds of doing well in the future. At the same time, the 
true risk of entering into business is displayed in the unconditional estimates (Table 3) rather than 
in conditional estimates (Table 4), because the former incorporate the likelihood of business’ 
survival and business survival is not very likely. A clear conclusion emerges: business 
owenership is risky. At the same time, it seems that income from wage work is not as stable as is 
commonly believed. Even with the short tenure in business the attempt of entrepreneurial 
undertaking may have positive influence in future earnings. On one hand, there is immediate 
improvement in earnings odds for people entering into business ownership. On the other, there is 
a penalty for agents going back into the wage sector. One question remains open: Who is better 
off in the long run? In the next section I estimate terminal outcome of these monthly income 
transitions.   
3.4    Long-Run Consequences of Business Creation 
One of the most attractive features about estimating transition matrices is that doing so 
allows us to make conjectures about the long-term consequences of entrepreneurship at horizons 
well beyond those covered by the sample data. In this section, I make use of the transition 
matrices in Table 1 and 2 to explore the following questions. 
●  How do the earnings of agents that create a business in period 0 compare at some future 
period t with the earnings of agents who never create a business? 
●  How do the long-term earnings of agents that create a business in period 0 and that who 
survive in business compare at some future period t with the earnings of agents who never create 
a business? 
These questions can be answered by straightforward manipulation of the estimated 
transition matrices. To obtain the distribution of earnings of agents that never create a business, I 
use the lower right matrix from Table 2, beginning with the steady-state wage distribution. To 
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consider the evolution of the earnings distribution of business creators who never fail, I make use 
of (i) the steady-state wage distribution and the relative distribution of transitions from the bottom 
half of the first column of Table 2 to calculate the initial business earnings distribution, and then I 
use the matrix in the upper left of Table 2.  
Then, given an initial distribution vector d and a transition matrix P, the distribution of 
earnings by time t is given by the repeated (t times) transition through the probability matrix6 
ܲ ൌ ൥
݌ଵଵ … ݌ହଵ
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
݌ଵହ … ݌ହହ
൩ , 
where ݌௜௝	denotes an actual probability of transitioning into a ith income quintile from jth  income 
quintile at any point of time. These probabilities are calculated from actual movements of all 
agents through the distribution vector d over the entire life of the panel. After t transitions the 
probability matrix is given by 
		ܲ௧ ൌ ൥
݌ଵଵ … ݌ହଵ
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
݌ଵହ … ݌ହହ
൩
௧
 
and as ݐ → ∞ limiting distribution can be derived by solving for ݌௜	݅ ൌ 1,⋯ ,5	 the following 
system of six equations: 
ە
ۖ
۔
ۖ
ۓ݌ଵ ൌ ݌ଵ ∙ ݌ଵଵ ൅ ݌ଶ ∙ ݌ଶଵ ൅ ݌ଷ ∙ ݌ଷଵ ൅ ݌ସ ∙ ݌ସଵ ൅ ݌ହ ∙ ݌ହଵ݌ଶ ൌ ݌ଵ ∙ ݌ଵଶ ൅ ݌ଶ ∙ ݌ଶଶ ൅ ݌ଷ ∙ ݌ଷଶ ൅ ݌ସ ∙ ݌ସଶ ൅ ݌ହ ∙ ݌ହଶ
݌ଷ ൌ ݌ଵ ∙ ݌ଵଷ ൅ ݌ଶ ∙ ݌ଶଷ ൅ ݌ଷ ∙ ݌ଷଷ ൅ ݌ସ ∙ ݌ସଷ ൅ ݌ହ ∙ ݌ହଷ
݌ସ ൌ ݌ଵ ∙ ݌ଵସ ൅ ݌ଶ ∙ ݌ଶସ ൅ ݌ଷ ∙ ݌ଷସ ൅ ݌ସ ∙ ݌ସସ ൅ ݌ହ ∙ ݌ହସ
݌ହ ൌ ݌ଵ ∙ ݌ଵହ ൅ ݌ଶ ∙ ݌ଶହ ൅ ݌ଷ ∙ ݌ଷହ ൅ ݌ସ ∙ ݌ସହ ൅ ݌ହ ∙ ݌ହହ
݌ଵ ൅ ݌ଶ ൅ ݌ଷ ൅ ݌ସ ൅ ݌ହ ൌ 100
 
I then to derive the limiting distributions for wage workers, all agents attempting business 
(this includes both failing and successful businesses), and the successful business owners. The 
                                                 
6 See for Example Clark, B. and Disney, R. (1985) “Probability and Random Processes: A First Course 
with Applications”, 2nd Edition. John, Wiley and Sons: 218-245 
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corresponding solution vectors are given by W for wage workers, B for all agents attempting 
business and S for successful business owners: 
ࢃ ൌ
ۉ
ۈۈ
ۇ17.7710219.73451
20.00963
20.98742
21.49742ی
ۋۋ
ۊ
; 			࡮ ൌ
ۉ
ۈۈ
ۇ18.0087718.50449
18.58422
20.42565
24.47687ی
ۋۋ
ۊ
; 			܁ ൌ
ۉ
ۈۈ
ۇ15.7728715.99597
16.93581
18.73297
32.56238ی
ۋۋ
ۊ
;		 
Notice that one desirable estimate of a limiting distribution is missing. One may want to 
figure out the limiting distribution for failed business owners explicitly. However, this is not 
possible as a result of the nature of these transitions. To get to a limiting distribution agents have 
to transition through the same probability matrix repeatedly until it converges on the limiting 
distribution vector. Clearly, failing business owners transition back into the wage sector and 
would go through the corresponding wage workers’ matrix in the following period. Hence, 
repeated transition through “failing business” matrix is not possible by the definition of business 
failure.  
Successful business owners have a much higher probability (almost 33 percent), 
compared to two other groups chances, of ending up in the top quintile of income distribution. 
Their odds of ending up in the top two quintiles, at 57 percent, are also much higher than is the 
case for the other two groups. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, success in business is financially 
rewarding. This is especially true since the decision of exit is endogenous and any agent 
performing below her expectations can simply quit and go back to wage work. A more important 
comparison is that of chances which wage workers face to those trying their luck at business 
ownership. This is especially true since people undertaking a risk of business ownership mostly 
are not aware of their entrepreneurial ability, which they can only find out by giving business 
ownership a try. Comparing all business to all workers vectors quintile by quintile shows that for 
most part agents attempting business ownership are slightly better off in the long run in terms of 
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their odds of getting into the highest income category. People attempting business ownership 
have 24 percent chance to getting into the top quintile compared to 21 percent for the wage 
workers. For wage workers the odds of ending up in two top income quintiles are about 42.5 
percent, whereas for business owners those are 44.9 percent. At the same time business 
undertakers have a slightly higher, less than half a percentage point, chance of finishing in the 
lowest quintile of the income distribution when compared to the chances faced by wage workers.  
Naturally, one would like to know how fast the probabilities approach these limiting 
distribution estimates. I calculate the transition matrices for each of the groups for 9 periods. By 
the 9th transition through the matrices of Tables 1 and 2, the income distributions have converged 
very close to the calculated values of the limiting distribution. There are, however, some 
differences in convergence speed; most notably, surviving business owners exhibit slower 
convergence rates. Figures 3 ,4 and 5 depict convergence to selected quintiles. 
Figure 3. Wage Earners Convergence Speed Example 
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Figure 4. Successful Business Convergence Speed Example 
 
Figure 5. All Business Convergence Speed Example 
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From the convergence rates shown in the figures, it is clear that the limiting distribution 
is reached fairly quickly. The odds for surviving businesses remain more uncertain for a longer 
period of time. In other words, the income category of a successful business owner remains 
dependent on hir or her initial earnings quintile for a onger period of time than is the case for the 
other groups. The odds for the remaining two groups settle on their corresponding limiting values 
fairly quickly. This dichotomy adds to another dimension of stability of wage work (since the B 
vector is also driven by people returing into the wage sector). Business success while likely to be 
rewarding, eventually, takes a bit longer for all entrepreneurs to be facing settled odds depicted 
by the limiting distribution vector. Within nine months of entering monthly transition matricies, 
wage workers and all business entrants face specific odds of their final income quintile 
destination. Succesful entrepreneurs take longer than 9 months to arrive at their limiting 
distribution values. At the same time it is clear that it does not take many years for all participants 
to get to their respective limiting distribution vectors. These clearly established odds are the most 
attractive feature of limiting distributions as it does not matter where one starts from, within short 
period of time (9 month for wage workers and all people trying entrepreneurship, and a bit longer 
for successful entrepreneurs), agents in the same group face the same income transition odds. 
This phenomenon makes limiting distribution vectors a very attractive tool, which can be used for 
group comparisons. 
What is most important is that there is no monetary penalty for giving business ownership 
a shot. In other words, rational, risk neutral individual, should take her chances at business 
ownership as she would expect to be at least as well off as continuing employment in the wage 
sector. This is especially true if we are to believe that all agents are not aware of their 
entrepreneurial ability ex ante, an assumption supported by the existence of very short business 
tenures. Moreover, such short business tenure is not problematic is there is no income penalty for 
trying business ownership. 
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4.    Conclusion  
My paper contributes to the wage-worker entrepreneur earnings comparisons by 
undertaking a careful examination of the dynamical aspect of earnings. Individuals’ movement 
within the income distribution is examined for both wage workers and entrepreneurs with 
particular attention paid to switches from one type of employment to the other. Dividing the 
income distribution into quintiles helps in capturing the movement between those income classes, 
as it can be characterized explicitly. Transitions from period to period are found to exhibit the 
Markov property. These immediate transitions can be considered as short-run income changes. In 
the short run, I find it is beneficial to enter self-employment but costly to transition back into the 
wage sector. This is the cost of entrepreneurial failure.  
Additionally, the long-term likelihood of income transitions movements is estimated via 
the derivation of limiting distributions. These limiting distributions represent steady state type of 
probabilities of transitioning from one income category into the other faced by groups of agents: 
wage workers, all people trying business ownership out, and successful business people. 
Convergence onto the steady state of probabilities depicting transitions from one income category 
into another is fairly fast – meaning the long run realization is likely to occur anywhere within six 
month to two years. One notable exception is that successful business owners take longer to 
arrive at their respective limiting distribution. Hence, the odds of long term earnings changes take 
longer to settle for the established business owners.  
The main finding of this study is that business ownership is risky. The risk, however, is 
mainly reflected in the very short tenure of business ownership and drastic changes to one’s 
earnings associated with changes in employment type. This can be viewed as a short term penalty 
paid by failing business owners. Entrepreneurship per se is not found to exhibit more income 
volatility than wage work. Earnings volatility is the highest when transitioning from wage to 
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business sector and back again. Another important finding is that taking on business ownership 
carries no long term future earnings penalty; moreover, it is rewarding (in terms of future income) 
to give entrepreneurship a try. Agents entering into entrepreneurship, regardless of their future 
success, face slightly better chances to end up in the upper tail of the income distribution in the 
long run. This combination of short term costs and long term rewards is one of the main 
contributions of this paper. The other is the actual estimate of when the long run is, finding that 
they wait for a steady state probabilities of changes in one’s income is fairly short. 
The volatility found in this paper is on a par with other recent investigations (Acs, 
Loprest, and Nichols 2009; Congressional Budget Office 2007). Nonetheless, the volatility itself 
should not be taken entirely at face value because at least two systematic biases influence the 
estimates. First, seam bias is a result of the SIPP survey design where monthly data is collected in 
batches every four months. This introduces a four- month period for which surveyed people need 
to account by recollecting relevant information. Recollection is imperfect and suffers from seam 
bias, where surveyed individuals are more likely to attribute any changes to the first month rather 
than any other. Another issue is the actual reimbursement schemes commonly employed. The 
fifty-two week pay system creates systematic imperfections with an unequal number of pay 
periods for different months. Other factors such as interest, dividends payments, tax returns and 
tax payments also skew the pay schedule. I undertook a four-month analysis as a robustness 
check and as means to reduce seam bias. Volatility in earnings persists nonetheless. I attribute 
this persistence to short business tenure and drastic earnings changes associated with that along 
with other biases mentioned above. So long as these biases do not effect wage workers and 
entrepreneurs differently a meaningful comparison can be made. This is because it is not the 
volatility itself but rather the comparison of wage workers to entrepreneurs that is the subject of 
this paper.    
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Extensions to this work could proceed in two directions: First, longer time periods, larger 
panels and other datasets could be examined to compare probability estimates. This is a very 
useful exercise because of the importance of what the limiting distributions tell us. Limiting 
distributions enable researchers to look at outcomes beyond the life of any panel. If earnings are 
the primary motivation for business ownership, limiting distributions are the best estimates of 
what eventually awaits the entrepreneur. This information would be welcomed by entrepreneurs, 
policymakers, financial institutions, and academicians. Improving these estimates is of 
tremendous value. A second direction for future work is to better understand the reasons behind 
short business tenures. Cross-sectional views of the entrepreneurial population miss many 
dynamic components of the entrepreneurial population. An important feature, which has 
previously received little attention, is uncovered in this paper. Most people claiming to be 
business owners are in and out of the entrepreneurial status very quickly. Improving our 
understanding of this dynamic could help reduce erroneous entry, improve success rates, improve 
financing and guarantee schemes, and improve overall social efficiency.  
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IV.    A Consumption-Based Measure of the Monetary Rewards to 
Entrepreneurship 
1.      Introduction  
 
My third paper examines the monetary returns to entrepreneurship. I compare rewards of 
self-employment to those of wage employment. This is, of course, an exercise that has been 
carried out many times before. However, previous studies have typically overlooked a potentially 
important source of bias that arises from the propensity of entrepreneurs to underreport their 
income. As a result, evidence  that entrepreneurship is not a monetarily rewarding undertaking, 
and that other nonmonetary rewards must be important (Hamilton 2000; Moskowitz and Vissing-
Jorgensen 2002), may be misleading. In this paper I produce indirect evidence of underreporting 
of income in survey data, and I provide alternative measures of monetary rewards to 
entrepreneurship based on consumption data. My paper also estimates the effects of previous 
business ownership on current consumption. Contrary to some recent investigations, I  find 
entrepreneurship to be a financially rewarding activity. 
Numerous obstacles present themselves when measuring the earnings of entrepreneurs. 
First, the distribution of income appears to have “fat tails”, suggesting that OLS estimates are 
likely unreliable.7 In this paper, I employ a quintile regression method, which is a better metric 
for contrasting earnings distributions produced by two groups, such as wage workers and the self-
employed (Hamilton 2000). Second, because the returns to self-employment consist of salary and 
accumulated business equity, the income of entrepreneurs is hard to define and track. Business 
equity is hard to measure unless the researcher examines the entire lifespan of a given firm, and 
even then, dissolution of a business only reveals its equity value at that particular point in time. In 
other words, an entrepreneur could have received more (or less) funds if she was to sell the 
                                                 
7 The heavy right tail of this income distribution produces support for the superstar theory (Rosen 1981) 
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business earlier. The issue is further complicated by entrepreneurs who stay in business for 
periods beyond the boundaries of any data collection survey. However, by tracking consumption 
instead of income, it may be possible to capture the wealth effect by observing increased 
spending of the entrepreneur. Additionally, lifestyle comparisons obtained from consumption 
measures are likely to be more reliable because they do not rely on income, which, even if not 
hidden, is computed differently from wage income because of different legal metrics and 
reporting methods by entrepreneurs.  
At the same, time some benefits of self-employment are very hard to measure, regardless 
of the metric at hand. Much more serious complications arise if a researcher attempts to measure 
less obvious business benefits, some of which include use of business assets for personal use, or 
claiming personal expenditures as business expenses. Nonmonetary benefits of wage 
employment, such as fringe benefits, are much easier to measure because they appear as business 
costs on their employers' books. This drawback associated with difficulty of measuring 
nonmonetary benefits of self-employment is also better addressed through consumption 
comparisons: the researcher can detect differences in particular consumption categories in which 
there is no overlap with business expenditures – housing expenditures, vacations, money spent on 
clothing, etc.  
The consumption comparison approach carries significant benefits in assessing and 
addressing both expense overstatements and income underreporting. By examining expenditures 
in a number of discrete categories and subcategories, I can allocate particular expenditures into 
business, individual consumption, or both categories, thus facilitating better estimates of earnings 
spent on personal consumption. Overstatements of business expenditures, together with hiding of 
income by the self-employed, comprise the underreporting gap. The underreporting gap is quite 
significant given that U.S. General Office of Accounting states that entrepreneurs are responsible 
for 68% of the $48 billion underreported gap in 1987 (USGAO 1990). It is a striking number 
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considering that the self-employment rate remained below 10% throughout the 1980s (Hipple 
2004).  
In this paper, I show that consumption among entrepreneurs is strictly greater than consumption 
of wage earners, even after controlling for race, education, experience, family size, and wealth. 
This is in striking contrast to recent investigations, claiming that entrepreneurship does not pay 
(Hamilton 2000; Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen 2002). These investigations have relied on 
income data in order to reach their conclusions without any adjustments for income 
underreporting, which is best detected by examining consumption data. To detect income 
underreporting, one has to either assume (or calculate) saving rates for each of the groups (self-
employed and wage earners), or assume that an individual’s propensity to save is constant over 
time. I rely heavily on previous estimates of saving rates in assessing income underreporting. 
Noting that entrepreneurs save more than their wage counterparts (Caner 2003; Dynan, Skinner et 
al. 2004; Siman 2008) by creating an interaction term of income and self-employment, I am able 
to detect underreporting of earnings. Higher saving rates by the entrepreneurs should then lead to 
a negative sign of the interaction term when regressing expenditure of the self-employed on 
income, demographics, and the interaction term. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID), I show repeatedly a positive, highly significant sign on the interaction term, suggesting 
extensive underreporting of income. I also detect underreporting using a second assumption 
(constant individual marginal propensities to save) by observing changes in sign of an interaction 
term (income and self-employment status) with change of employment status. 
I then proceed to compare wage rewards to entrepreneurial rewards without using income 
by switching to consumption metrics. Not surprisingly, consumption comparisons shows greater 
benefits for the entrepreneurs than do income comparisons. These results might of course be 
contaminated by sample selection problems. Sample selection bias could arise because a sample 
of current entrepreneurs consists of those who either just started or those who chose to remain 
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self-employed and are thus deemed to be successful entrepreneurs. However, to form an accurate 
interpretation of entrepreneurial earnings, it is important to examine the earnings of all subjects, 
not just the successful ones. I therefore also estimate effects of previous business ownership on 
current consumption in order to ameliorate my estimates. I find evidence that those remaining in 
business enjoy the largest consumption premium but even those who are no longer self-employed, 
on average, get a small increase in their consumption. Additionally, making sure the sign of the 
interaction term switches for individuals at the same time as changes in their individual self-
employment status (i.e., going back into wage sector, or becoming self-employed), ensures that 
underreporting accounts for sign of the interaction term and not some fixed effect, which could be 
associated with people who are more likely to undertake entrepreneurship.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, I review the literature, in 
Section 3 I describe the data, in Section 4, I describe the analysis, and Section 5 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2.    Literature Review 
Measuring earnings is important to help researchers and policymakers understand the 
entrepreneur. In the most simple scenario, policymakers want to be able to identify able 
entrepreneurs ex ante in order to provide the future self-employed the necessary support. The 
entrepreneur is the Superman of economics, he is credited with fostering innovation, creating 
jobs, keeping production efficient, and producing exactly what consumers desire.  
As Adam Smith noted,   
[w]hen an independent workman, such as a weaver or shoemaker, has got more 
stock than what is sufficient to purchase the materials of his own work, and to 
maintain himself till he can dispose of it, he naturally employs one or more 
journeymen with the surplus, in order to make a profit by their work  (Smith 1776). 
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If this career choice is motivated by profit, as in Smith's vision, then it is a very straight 
forward case where uncertainty of business profits is rewarded by a larger than wage profit (profit 
for Adam Smith is the combination of interest and risk rewards). Hence, the expectation is that 
entrepreneurial earnings are higher than what the entrepreneur can get otherwise by earning a less 
risky wage working for someone else. There could be other nonmonetary reasons as to why 
people choose these careers. However, it seems that alternative explanations are proposed only 
after self-employment is found not to be financially rewarding, because otherwise profit is the 
most natural explanation for why people choose entrepreneurship.   
The inquiry into earnings comparison originates in the desire to empirically verify several 
models explaining why some people choose entrepreneurship. One of the first rigorous theoretical 
models to explain entrepreneurship was developed by Kihstrom and Laffont  (1979) who 
stipulated that risk tolerances were responsible for selection into an entrepreneurial. Essentially, a 
random parameter in the production function imposes some uncertainty on the output, thus 
attracting more risk tolerant agents to business ownership. Unfortunately, risk is hard to measure 
empirically, although several attempts have been made (Hersch and Viscusi 2001; Cramer, 
Hartog et al. 2002; Sanarelli and Vivarelli 2007; Krichevskiy 2009). Nonetheless, Kihlstrom and 
Laffont opened up the floodgates of theoretical models and empirical investigations by formally 
modeling what Adam Smith in 1770s and Frank Knight in the 1920s stipulated about the 
entrepreneur (Smith 1776; Knight 1916-1921).  
Three new classes of models have subsequently emerged: 1) investments and agency 
models (Lazear and Moore 1984) claiming that earnings profiles differ from wage workers to 
self-employed because entrepreneurs do not need to be provided incentivized to perform;  2) 
matching and learning models (Jovanovic 1982) where entering firms do not know what the true 
costs are and thus have to rely on some prior beliefs to make an entry choice. Upon entry, costs 
are revealed and firms update their beliefs about their costs (this could be viewed as firm quality) 
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and only the best survive, while those that made an erroneous entry choice exit; 3) alternatively, 
either the beliefs (Steen 2004) or the information used in updating (see Chapter I) could be 
incorrect, or the utility is not fully measured because there could also be nonpecuniary benefits to 
business ownership. If an entrepreneur is neither overoptimistic nor  misled about the profit 
potential upon entry, but earns less profit compared to wage work, it is reasonable to assume that 
she derives her utility elsewhere (e.g,. the benefit of being in control). However, these 
conclusions are usually drawn only after the realization that entrepreneurship is not as monetarily 
rewarding as wage work. In all three models, mentioned above, rewards matter and the next step 
is to empirically measure those rewards. Nonpecuniary benefits aside, which group has higher 
earnings? 
There are papers claiming that entrepreneurship does not pay (Hamilton 2000; Moskowitz 
and Vissing-Jorgensen 2002), as well as other works claiming that entrepreneurs are better off 
(Rees and Shah 1986; Borjas and Bronars 1989; Brock and Evans 1989; Evans and Leighton 
1989; Quadrini 1999). The varied conclusions are caused by numerous complications associated 
with defining an average entrepreneur, choice of household vs. individual comparison, measuring 
entrepreneur’s profits (business equity in particular), choice of hourly wage vs. annual income 
comparisons, and by a choice of control variables. For example, Quadrini (1999) reports higher 
household annual incomes for families whose head of the household is self-employed and those 
who have any family member as the self-employed. The main goal of Quadrini’s paper is to 
measure wealth accumulation by the entrepreneurs; he uses both Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) and Consumer Survey of Finance (CSF) data. However, Quadrini does not 
control for either education or hours worked; he also does not measure business equity. In 
contrast, Hamilton (2000), finds that entrepreneurs get both lower initial earnings and lower 
earnings growth. Hamilton uses the Survey of Program and Income Participation (SIPP) and 
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estimates hourly earnings while also controlling for education and tracking changes in business 
equity.  
My paper uses annual income and annual consumption measures. I do not think hourly 
earnings are the best metric for measuring monetary rewards to employment, because the nature 
of work is different for the self-employed. First, the self-employed determine their work hours on 
the basis of the demands of the business, and are oftentimes not able to replace their expertise 
with that of employees. There is also no supervisor to make sure they only take, say, thirty 
minutes for lunch, meaning reported work hours are not necessary actual work hours (since 
business owners come and go as they please). Because of the absence of oversight, entrepreneurs 
may feel that they spend an entire workday at their business while in-between they might have 
managed to pick up their kids from schools or accomplish other personal tasks. Most wage jobs in 
the private and public sectors do not allow such flexibility. 
Second, most wage workers (especially in the lower half of the income distribution) would 
be happy to work overtime, thus accumulating more annual hours, but the choice is not theirs to 
make (business owners who have to pay higher wage rates for hours exceeding 40 hour per week 
are often discouraged from providing additional work hours to their workers). I draw a distinction 
between controls such as education, experience, race, and family size versus hours worked, with 
the former being a universal measure across population and the latter being a very different 
metric depending on the group in question. Unlike Hamilton, I therefore choose annual earnings 
measures instead of hourly earnings.  
Hamilton also addresses distributional differences by running quintile regressions, since the 
distribution of earnings for the self-employed is noted to have fat tails, this idea first emerged as a 
superstar theory put forward by Rosen (1981). Noting these distributional differences I also 
employ quintile regressions in my comparisons. Unfortunately, neither Quadrini nor Hamilton 
addresses the income underreporting issue, which is likely to change both of their estimates.   
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Some researchers maintain that income underreporting is partially circumvented because 
most research considers surveys that ask income questions directly and that do not rely on income 
tax data (Hamilton 2000). The idea is that net profits are not reported correctly but so long as 
econometricians have reported salary draw, overstatements of expenses do not appear in the data. 
This may not be true if the salary draw is also not reported honestly. My dataset contains both 
income reported to the IRS and income reported to the surveyors. The two income measures are 
very similar and produce virtually identical regression estimates; thus, income reported to the IRS 
is not different from that which is reported to researchers. Hence, if a person has reasons to 
misrepresent her income for the IRS, she is just as likely to do the same when it comes to 
interviews with government-funded surveys. 
The finding that self-employed underreport their income is not new. It has long been 
suspected that self-employment provides an opportunity for tax evasion and underreporting. This 
problem is not as rampant among wage earners whose income is reported by their employers. 
Thus, wage earners are not necessarily made of higher moral fiber than wage workers; they are 
simply deprived of the tax evasion opportunity. To address the widespread underreporting by the 
self-employed several measures have been proposed (Klepper and Nagin 1989; Feinstein 1991; 
Adreoni, Erard et al. 1998; Schuetze 2000). One way to overcome the problem and estimate 
someone’s income is to use consumption (expenditure) estimates (Pissarides and Weber 1989) 
derived from parametric (Baker 1993) and nonparametric (Tedds 2005) measures. These 
expenditure estimates give a researcher an idea as to how much a person should be earning (on 
average) given her level of consumption. I explore this avenue by examining consumption 
differences between entrepreneurs and wage earners. I measure distributional differences when 
comparing several measures of consumption for wage earners and the self-employed. I also find 
evidence of underreporting of income by entrepreneurs. Income underreporting places a big 
question mark on the traditional income comparisons among wage earners and the self-employed. 
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I suggest building consumption measures instead of outright income comparisons. To detect 
underreporting by the self-employed, I have to rely on the well-supported assumption that 
entrepreneurs save more (Quadrini 1999; Caner 2003; Dynan, Skinner et al. 2004; Siman 2008). 
In fact, wealthy individuals save more regardless of occupation (Reiter 2004). Wealth itself 
is correlated with entrepreneurship, or with so-called entrepreneurial ability (Hurst and Lusardi 
2004); entrepreneurs obtain higher wealth precisely because they save more. Entrepreneurs invest 
heavily in their own business (Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen 2002), which is oftentimes 
driven by either the information asymmetry or the expense and unavailability of external 
financing.  Continued re-investment into an entrepreneur’s own business could also hide some 
earnings from the observer.  
It appears that while, earning a lot less than their wage counterparts, entrepreneurs save a 
lot more. While it has been found that entrepreneurs accumulate more wealth (Quadrini 1999), 
most of the studies of saving patterns used income as a variable (Caner 2003; Siman 2008), which 
may be  problematic if income information is biased because to commonly overstated business 
expenses and understatement of income. But in a recent careful examination of savings Dynan et 
al., (2004) found that saving rates are almost identical for samples which included and excluded 
entrepreneurs. While zeroing in on the saving rates of the self-employed was not their explicit 
goal, by examining several large datasets (Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Survey of Consumer 
Finances, and Consumer Expenditure Survey) and looking at the long term (10 years) income 
averages they were able to side-step the issue of underreporting by entrepreneurs in establishing 
saving rates (over the periods of time extending beyond business tenure), even while using 
income. Thus, it is fair to assume when doing consumption comparisons that entrepreneurs do not 
save less than their wage counterparts. 
Armed with the fact that entrepreneurs save more, it is worth re-examining the income-
wealth relationship. Two components of the income-wealth relationship and findings about 
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savings still pose some problems: (1) it appears that entrepreneurs need to save a lot of their 
income to make up in wealth. This is paradoxical since it is hard to imagine people with a smaller 
income saving more (in absolute terms) than those whose incomes are significantly larger and (2) 
much more troubling, income estimates for entrepreneurs are not reliable if there is any 
underreporting on the part of the self-employed. Mindful of these underreporting issues, I re-
examine the income of the self-employed and compare it to the income of wage-workers. To 
circumvent the issue of income underreporting, I design consumption measures to better estimate 
levels of disposable income. I find that controlling for demographic variables and assets that self-
employed consume more, regardless of whether total expenditure, housing values and 
expenditures, car values, or utilities expenditures are used as a measure. As a result, this paper 
contributes to the existing self-employed vs. wage-worker income comparison debate as it points 
to significant monetary rewards associated with self-employment that are not captured by 
traditional income measures.  
There is also a bigger issue for economists to tackle, related to the core question of who 
reaps more benefits from their respective jobs, the self-employed or the wage worker? To 
understand who benefits more, income has been used as a means of obtaining desired goods and 
services. However, this may not be fully appropriate when comparing self-employed individuals 
with wage workers, even if neither group attempts to hide its incomes from the IRS (or surveys). 
Because business owners have the power to decide how business assets are used, and can 
potentially use these assets for personal benefits (e.g. transportation using the company car), it 
might be worthwhile to include these benefits into calculations of received earnings. Granted, 
sometimes similar benefits are available to the wage workers, for example a cab driver who does 
not own a vehicle may still go and do his grocery shopping using the taxicab However, these 
benefits are at the discretion of the business owner, and in many cases must be reported as 
income. In other words, if a business has a nice car, beach condo etc., business owners receive the 
67 
 
same utility from using these resources as private owners do, and thus they ultimately choose to 
use their cars, properties and other assets as they see fit. Unlike the intangible and unquantifiable 
psychological rewards of business ownership, resource use is tangible and should be measured. I 
argue that in light of the scope for underreporting, which is further complicated by definitional 
difficulties (in terms of what is a legitimate business expense and what is not) of income itself, 
consumption instead of income can be used to contrast monetary benefits of employment.  
Although consumption seems like a natural proxy for earnings, several challenges remain. First 
issue is the inability of researcher to separate true business expenditures from personal use 
consumption. For example, a self-employed person may purchase an expensive car to later write 
it off as a business expense. While this car could be helpful in signaling quality of the self-
employed to potential clients, making it a very useful business tool, the owner also enjoys this 
high quality product. For example, when hiring a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) a customer 
may perceive an expensive car driven by the CPA as a signal of experience, quality, or sign of 
fewer instances of IRS audit, all of which are measures of success. In this example the expensive 
car aids the entrepreneur (CPA) in attracting business clientele making it a useful business asset. 
However, at the end of the day, when she goes to the stores, malls, and restaurants, she enjoys the 
quality of the car in the pure consumption sense.  
Another issue arises with self-selection of people into self-employment. It may be 
necessary to have collateral in order to secure the funding crucial for establishment of a business. 
Hence, by observing that more of the self-employed own their own housing we cannot conclude 
that these differences are because of larger incomes as the wage workers with large incomes may 
be kept out of the self-employment because of lack of collateral. Accumulation of collateral can 
either come from bequest or from saving over time. So are the entrepreneurs (or prospective 
entrepreneurs) different when it comes to lifelong saving behavior? 
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To ensure that these entrepreneurial individuals do not have some fixed effect associated 
with their saving behavior and thus causing the income-entrepreneurship interaction term to serve 
as a proxy for this fixed effect: I look at the long-term history of business ownership. I create a 
number of terms interacting indicators for prior business ownership with current consumption. 
Observing the sign of the interaction terms, contingent on current business ownership only 
(essentially observing change in sign with the change of self-employment status), I find additional 
re-assurance that it is underreporting and not some fixed effect that is responsible for the sign of 
the significant interaction term. This method has not been previously used in the underreporting 
literature which has previously assumed the same marginal propensity to consume for everyone 
(Pissarides and Weber 1989). The only assumptions that I make are that 1) consumption is 
reported truthfully for everyone, 2) marginal propensities to consume remain constant for all 
agents for the duration of the study, and 3) self-employed individuals have higher saving rates, as 
has been repeatedly demonstrated (Quadrini 1999; Caner 2003; Dynan, Skinner et al. 2004; 
Siman 2008).  
  
 3.    Data 
I use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) as it offers a number of asset 
variables, income variables and most recently (starting with 2005 data) a number of detailed 
consumption variables. The PSID is designed to track individuals, but it also collects income and 
expenditure information on their spouses and, to a lesser degree, on other family members living 
with them. While my dataset does not contain a long history of consumption, it does have 
business ownership history, which I use to estimate the long-term effects of business ownership. 
By examining how current consumption levels differ among wage earners some of whom were 
previously self-employed but no longer are, I can see how long these differences persist after a 
person returns to wage employment.  
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My dataset consists of detailed observations for 2005, with demographic and income 
variables going as far back as the 1995 wave of PSID. I examine consumption to produce results 
comparable to income estimates of Hamilton (2000), I restrict my sample to males. Following 
convention, I exclude farmers and anyone outside the 18-65 age range. I also exclude people 
earning practice income, since they are often re-classified into self-employment as they become 
partners in their firms, but they are not self-employed in the conventional sense. The resulting 
sample consists of 4,797 people. Of these, 708 are what I will call self-employed (14.77%). This 
number is unusually high. Participants of the PSID survey are asked if they are working, and if 
”yes”, then the following options are given: (i) for someone else, (ii) themselves or (iii) both? 
Only seven percent of those surveyed work for themselves. However, since I am examining 
consumption and household consumption records are not disaggregated, it is possible to 
determine whose income went towards what (in terms of purchasing goods and services by 
members of the household), I use another variable in PSID in deciding whether the person is a 
part of the self-employed group. If any person answers positively to the question of whether they, 
or anyone else in their household, are self-employed, I place them in the self-employed group. I 
create similar variables for other years of the survey going back to 1995.  
The PSID underwent major revisions in 1997, starting bi-annual interviews instead of 
previously conducted annual interviews. Hence, my dataset includes 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999, 
2001, 2003, and 2005 interview variables. Demographic variables are carried through unless there 
is a change. I use demographic variables for the current year (2005) as the controls in the 
analyses. I also construct variables capturing whether a business owner is present in the 
household since the previous survey. In other words if there was a self-employed person in 1995-
97 but since then he or she either went back to the wage sector or left the household, I create a 
variable capturing this change in order to trace the effects of previous business tenure on current 
consumption. 
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It is not immediately obvious which consumption measure should be employed. I create 
several consumption measures with total annual consumption being the broadest – it includes 
total annual expenditure on housing, transportation (car leases, gasoline, parking, insurance, and 
public transportation), utilities (net of subsidies), food, clothing, child-care, adult-care, schooling, 
home repair, vacations, entertainment, and total donations. In the case of transportation, cars are 
often claimed as business expenses, but they are consumption goods as well. I keep expenditure 
on cars as consumption in my sample and exclude utility vehicles, which are used more for 
business than as consumption goods. I replicated my analysis excluding pickup trucks as well. 
This exclusion did not alter the results to any significant degree, so I re-introduced the pickup 
truck category into the data set, while excluding utility vehicles. In other measures of 
consumption, I used housing or utilities as the dependent variables only – these are much 
narrower definitions that oftentimes do not detect significant differences between the two groups. 
Income in my analysis includes wages, interest, royalties, rent, dividends and both public 
and private transfers. This variable encompasses head of the household income and spouse’s 
income as well. Additional income brought in by other family members both present at the 
household and transferring money from elsewhere is also accounted. I also repeated the entire 
analysis using taxable income, which is asked separately in the survey. The results were 
practically identical and are not reported here. 
 
4.    Group Differences, Underreporting and the Long Term Effects of Self-
Employment  
4.1    Descriptive Statistics and Group Differences 
I first set out to explore population differences between the self-employed and wage 
workers. I then examine their respective consumption profiles controlling for these differences. 
The two populations differ along every measured dimension. First, the average self-employed 
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person is older, more likely to be married, with more work experience and education; he has 
greater self-reported income and he also consumes more. I conducted non-parametric 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests (Conover 1999) on expenditure, income, education, and experience 
distributions. In each case, the distribution of the self-employed dominates those of wage 
workers, with p-values near zero. In my sample 86 percent of business owners are married 
compared to only 78 percent of married wage workers. The self-employed also differ from wage 
earners along racial, educational, and experience lines as well (Table 5).  As for distribution 
differences the findings are well in-line with the expectations given that self-employed are more 
experienced, and older. 
Another dimension along which the self-employed differ markedly from wage workers is 
in the amount of household assets and debt. The self-employed own more of all types of assets, 
including housing assets, stocks, and certificates of deposit. At the same time, the self-employed 
carry more debt (Table 6). Assets are necessary to obtain business financing, which is reflected in 
the greater housing equity held by the self-employed. Additionally, both assets and business loans 
generate debt since all of these are likely to be financed.  
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics of Demographic Variables 
 
  Self-Employed Wage Workers 
Mean age  46.46 40.65 
No children  54.06 51.19 
2 or more kids  9.37 11.81 
High school diploma only  26.85 34.59 
2 year college  17.65 19.82 
4 years +  15.54 7.49 
Race white  64.57 82.13 
10 yrs or less experience  40.91 53.11 
20 yrs or more experience  21.52 16.5 
          Values are percentage of total population 
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Table 6 Assets and Debt Comparison 
 
  Self-Employed Wage Workers 
Mean CD Savings  $31,154 $8,710 
Median CD Savings  $5,000 $1,000 
Percent of Population with CD ≥ 25,000  24.19 9.04 
Mean Housing Equity  $142,575 $94,768 
Median Housing Equity  $74,500 $53,000 
Percent of Population with Housing equity>500,000  8.2 2.09 
Mean Family Debt   $16,844 $7,709 
Median Family Debt ≥ 10,000  $2,000 $500 
Percent of Population with Family Debt ≥ 25,000  13.12 8.39 
 
 Significant demographic group differences create two very different income and consumption 
profiles. At the same time, even the raw plots of the distributions suggest some disparity in the 
reliability of income reporting. Figure 6 depicts estimated consumption and income distributions 
for the two groups. It demonstrates a within group income-consumption contrast revealing 
interesting patterns. In the case of the self-employed, it seems that consumption outpaces income, 
suggesting some underreporting of income taking place. There is no reason for which an entire 
group of people would be consuming beyond their current income – unless the group in question 
is the unemployed. Yet it seems that self-employed households enjoy consumption well beyond 
the levels allowed by the earnings they receive. At the same time, merely observing these 
differences of distributions is not sufficient to deduce that there is any underreporting of income. 
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Figure 6. Income and Consumption Densities for Wage Workers and the Self-
employed 
 
 
4.2    Personal Income and Expenditure Comparisons 
Unconditional distributions provide only a limited insight and are not entirely suitable for 
the comparison of rewards to employment – especially given what we know about differences in 
education, experience, and financial wellbeing among the two populations. Thus, I produce 
conditional estimates of both incomes and expenditures controlling for education, experience, and 
family size. I regress demographic variables and the self-employed dummy on both expenditure 
and the total consumption as in (1) and (2) 
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where ܧ௜ is expenditure, ܫ௜ is income, ܆	௜ is a vector of demographic variables and ܼ௜ is a self-
employment dummy. I produce both OLS estimates and quantile regression estimates at the 25th, 
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50th, and 75th percentiles, mindful of the fat tail distributions documented by Hamilton (2000). 
Tables 7 and 8 provide the results. 
Table 7 Expenditure and Self-Employment 
 
Variable OLS Quantile Regression 
.25 .50 .75 
Education 8.77*** 
(2.55)  
3.32*** 
(.20) 
5.52*** 
(.30) 
9.54*** 
(.93) 
Race White -18.17 
(14.52) 
6.51*** 
(1.28) 
7.76*** 
(1.72) 
10.28** 
(4.39) 
Experience -0.84 
(.74) 
.095 
(0.067) 
.50*** 
(.09) 
1.20*** 
(.21) 
Family size 55.24*** 
(11.69) 
-7.50*** 
(.88) 
-6.86*** 
(1.37) 
-10.64** 
(4.17) 
Self-Employed 35.51* 
(18.34) 
11.74*** 
(1.61) 
19.74*** 
(2.17) 
39.99*** 
(5.54) 
Constant 2.48 
(35.65 
-19.55** 
(2.90) 
-36.38*** 
(4.23) 
-61.70*** 
(12.71) 
R-squared 0.013 0.04 0.048 0.05 
Dep. Var: Total Expenditure in thousands. N=3082 
***α=0.01. **α=0.05. *α=0.1 
 
 
It is immediately clear that the choice between mean or median comparisons, as well as 
the choice of consumption versus income, yields very different results. Quantile regressions 
produce a slightly better fit when comparing the R-squared of the OLS to the pseudo R-squared of 
any of the quantile regressions; Figure 1 also shows severe skewness and non-normality, which 
also suggests quantile regressions are more appropriate. Consequently, I shall pay more attention 
to them than to the results obtained via OLS. However, using either specification, it is clear that 
self-employed earn more. Moreover, regardless of the methodology, expenditure premiums of 
self-employment are larger than income premiums. This suggests underreporting on part of the 
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self-employed, especially since we would expect the opposite results given higher saving rates of 
the self–employed.  
 
Table 8 Income and Self-Employment 
 
Variable OLS Quantile Regression 
.25 .50 .75 
Education 10.25*** 
(1.17) 
4.61*** 
(.24) 
6.80*** 
(.32) 
8.54*** 
(.53) 
Race White 24.75*** 
(6.81) 
13.05*** 
(1.60) 
16.11*** 
(1.90) 
17.45*** 
(2.62) 
Experience .79** 
(.33) 
.26*** 
(.088) 
.46*** 
(.09) 
1.06*** 
(0.12) 
Family size -9.18** 
(5.93) 
-5.90*** 
(1.20) 
-7.72*** 
(1.66) 
-9.52*** 
(2.53) 
Self-Employed 30.79*** 
(8.77) 
-.57 
(2.04) 
5.32** 
(2.45) 
16.47*** 
(3.40) 
Constant -83.59*** 
(16.39) 
-35.96*** 
(3.52) 
-45.62*** 
(4.59) 
-46.29*** 
(7.33) 
R-squared 0.038 0.065 0.084 0.095 
Dep. Var: total income in thousands.   N=3601. 
***α=0.01. **α=0.05. *α=0.1 
 
 
4.3    Underreporting  
A closer examination of the data suggests that some income claims made by the surveyed 
self-employed individuals are not likely to hold up to scrutiny. For example, 51.8 percent of 
males and their spouses who claim to be self-employed only (these are the households where 
everyone is self-employed) claim to have received exactly zero income from their self-
employment in 2005. This clearly is not likely. Additionally, it would mean severe dissavings on 
the part of these households. To confirm my suspicion of underreporting I regress demographic 
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variables such as race, individual’s education, experience, family size, total income and the 
interaction term between income and business ownership on the total expenditure. My model 
specification is 
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where ܧ௜ is expenditure, X୧ is the vector of demographic variables, I୧ is individual’s income, and 
D୧ is the interaction term. I find strongly significant positive coefficients on the income x business 
ownership interaction term (see Table 9). This suggests that the self-employed are underreporting 
their income since their higher saving rates should lead to a negative coefficient if they were to 
report their income honestly. 
Table 9 Evidence of Income underreporting. 
 
Variable OLS Quintile Regression 
.25 .50 .75 
Income .000065445 
(.0000458526) 
.0001690939*** 
(.0000458526) 
.0003322333*** 
(.0000042246) 
.0005700435*** 
(.0000052913) 
Education 7.596428*** 
(2.801553) 
2.178698*** 
(.1462655) 
2.922443*** 
(.2578926) 
4.339161*** 
(.5867257) 
Race -18.17901 
 (16.32578) 
3.811877*** 
(.9476383) 
3.198972** 
 (1.50196) 
5.118825* 
(2.890641) 
Experience -.986501 
(.8130209) 
0.03359129 
(.04890513) 
.2768124*** 
(.07486109) 
.6390559*** 
(.1382626) 
Family size 72.16536*** 
(13.83903) 
-5.674421*** 
(.7051715) 
-5.218422*** 
(1.267869) 
-6.752845* 
(2.818167) 
Interaction 
Term 
.0002034619*** 
(.0000692232) 
.0000526269*** 
(.0000045018) 
.0000328126*** 
(.0000063774) 
.0002601576*** 
(.0000083956) 
Constant 15.85689 
(39.23889) 
-10.37368*** 
(2.093101) 
-16.34522*** 
(3.610893) 
-25.89748*** 
(8.075975) 
Dep. variable expenditure in thousands      (N=2705;=0.023; =0.084; =0.099;=0.11) 
***α=0.01. **α=0.05. *α=0.1 
 
77 
 
In Table 10, I show repeatedly (using specification (3) with variables representing current 
income interacted with indicators for self-employment status in previous years) a positive sign on 
the interaction term for current business owners and mixed signs for people who are no longer 
self-employed (see Appendix 3 for complete regression results). Finding mixed sign for the wage 
workers' interaction terms is not surprising since I do not have any particular expectation about 
the saving rates for the wage workers. In fact, the coefficient turns out to be negative for most 
years, whereas for current business owners the positive sign suggests continued income 
underreporting.  
Table 10 Additional evidence of Income underreporting. (10th percentile) 
 
Interaction Term  Self-Employed 
2005 
Wage Worker 
2005 
Number of Cases Self 
Employed (SE) and 
Wage Workers (WW) 
1995xCurrent Income .0000807*** 
(.0000277) 
.000177*** 
(.0000139) 
SE 158 
WW 817 
1996xCurrent Income .0000980*** 
(.0000276) 
-.000169*** 
(.0000125) 
SE 164 
WW 839 
1997xCurrent Income .0000708** 
(.0000325) 
-.000171*** 
(.0000096) 
SE 171 
WW 957 
1999xCurrent Income .0000381 
(.0000280) 
-.000197*** 
(.0000112) 
SE 182 
WW 1067    
2001xCurrent Income .0000697** 
(.0000318) 
-.000197*** 
(.0000112) 
SE 192 
WW 1185 
2003xCurrent Income .0000113*** 
(.0000284) 
-.000313** 
(.0000142) 
SE 212 
WW 1351 
Dep. variable expenditure in thousands, ***α=0.01. **α=0.05. *α=0.1 
Other regressors: Total Income, Education, Experience, Family Size, Race 
 
The regressions in Table 10 show the sign of the interaction term to be contingent on business 
ownership.  In my regressions the interaction term for the self-employed always has both positive 
sign. Table 10 presents results for the 10th quintile of the expenditure distribution using quantile 
regression. These results are robust to changes in specification with similar signs on the 
interaction coefficient for other quintiles. The regression signs for the lower 10th quintile are the 
same as those from 25th, 75th, 90th, or 95th quintiles (not reported here). But for the 10th percentile 
I find statistical significance for interaction term much more often (compared to 25th, 50th, or 75th 
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quintile). My suspicion is that 10th percentile shows a significant sign more often because of 
lower variances in the left tail of income distributions for both groups. The results in Table 10 
lead to the conclusion that the self–employed do not have any particular tendencies associated 
with income underreporting as a fixed individual trait. To the contrary, they only underreport 
their income while they are in still in business. 
 
 4.4    Long Run Effects 
I now examine how previous business tenure affects current consumption. I regress the 
same demographic variables (excluding income) on current consumption, adding previous 
business ownership dummies. These dummies record previous years’ business ownership while 
all other variables continue to report current consumption and current demographics. My model 
specification is  
																																												ܧ௜ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ࢄ௜ᇱߚ௜ ൅ ܼ௜ ൅ ߳௜																																																																		ሺ4ሻ 
where Zi is a specific year of business ownership. 
I run this specification for both types of individuals: those currently in the wage sector 
and those currently self-employed.  I produce estimates for both mean (via OLS regression) and 
median (via quantile regressions). The results are very similar in nature with those agents who are 
still self-employed enjoying the largest consumption premiums. For both median and mean 
estimates the same cannot be concluded about the people who went back into the wage sector, as 
we cannot observe the reason for this change of status. Returning to the wage sector could be 
because of failure of business venture (bankruptcy for example) or it could be a successful sale of 
a business. There is a large body of literature addressing firms' exit and how it is related to 
success and failure (Headd 2003). The benefits of previous business ownership are highly 
correlated with current consumption (survival and success go hand in hand). At the same time, 
the only conclusive results for current wage workers who were previously self-employed is that, 
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on average (in both median and mean regressions), there is a positive shock to current 
consumption due to previous business ownership. Median estimation results are summarized in 
Table 11, whereas mean estimates (with the 95 percent confidence intervals) are shown in Figure 
7. 
Table 11 reveals that even after controlling for demographic differences long term average effects 
are positive. On average, even after business tenure has completed, there are positive effects on 
consumption that extend for up to four years after the termination of a business. Even combined 
with the fact that for those that stayed in business effects are mostly larger, the finding of a 
lingering positive effect suggests that undertaking self-employment has rewards even if one was 
to go back into the wage sector. This suggests that on average, business termination is not failure 
when compared to wage work. This, "on average" statement needs to be taken at face value - 
while on average the effect is non-negative for many agents the change is negative nonetheless, 
because this average is not statistically significant and a large portion of the confidence interval is 
in the negative territory . Recent investigation of long term effects using income finds that an 
individual significant penalty (via income reduction) is paid by entrepreneurs returning to the 
wage sector (see Chapter II), yet in the long run it pays off to attempt business ownership - 
regardless of the success of the business venture. Using SIPP I previously found that people 
attempting business ownership have bigger chance of ending up in higher income classes. These 
effects are likely to be even more pronounced given income underreporting of the self-employed.    
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Table 11. Long Run Effects of Self-Employment (Median Regression) 
 
Business 
Ownership Year 
Self-Employed 
2005 
Wage Worker 
2005 
Number of Cases Self 
Employed (SE) and 
Wage Workers (WW) 
1995 Business 28.57** 
(12.81) 
18.18*** 
(5.65) 
SE 185 
WW 915 
1996 Business 11.25** 
(4.89) 
11.25** 
(4.89) 
SE 192 
WW 942 
1997 Business 2.08 
(9.89) 
4.53 
(4.77) 
SE 202 
WW 1073 
1999 Business 1.96 
(7.04) 
1.22 
(4.91) 
SE 214 
WW 1198 
2001 Business 3.71 
(3.83) 
3.71 
(3.83) 
SE 226 
WW 1330 
2003 Business .000011*** 
(.000028) 
-.00031** 
(.000014) 
SE 248 
WW 1517 
Dep. variable expenditure in thousands, ***α=0.01. **α=0.05. *α=0.1 
Other regressors8: Total Income, Education, Experience, Family Size, Race 
 
Figure 7. Long-Run Effects of Self-employment  
 
                                                 
8 Full regression results are reported in the Appendix 3 
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Excluding income from the regressions completely is likely to create an omitted variable 
bias, since income matters in the determination of an individual’s consumption levels. But as it is 
underreported by the self-employed, including income will offset the findings associated with the 
self-employed and the regression dummy coefficient. Hence, removal of income and using a 
consumption comparison alone is more informative. I look at the coefficients of correlation for 
the relevant variables and try to determine the magnitude of the bias created by the omission. It 
could be assumed that the correlation coefficient for the wage workers is the unbiased estimate, 
which could be used to adjust the incomes of the self-employed. However, economists are not yet 
set on the systematic differences between the two groups and because of that we cannot assume 
that the relationship of income to consumption is the same. This is partially because of different 
spending patterns created by legitimate business expenses. Nonetheless, the coefficients of 
correlation themselves provide some evidence of the disparities, but even very big systematic 
differences among the two groups should not lead to the striking differences observed; I find a 
coefficient of 0.48 for the self-employed and 0.04 for the wage workers. Needless to say that both 
the difference over 10 times in magnitude and the 3% income consumption correlation for the 
wage workers seem unrealistic. Clearly, better estimates are needed. An ideal way to address this 
issue is via a long panel data examination with both income and consumption, which should 
create better coefficients for people who have switched from self-employment into the wage 
sector and back as their fixed effects could be controlled for. Nonetheless, this paper 
demonstrates the importance of underreporting issue, which needs to be carefully considered in 
any earnings comparison. 
 
5.    Conclusion  
The self-employed are financially better off compared to the wage workers even after 
controlling for their respective demographics. This finding is in stark contrast to some of the 
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recent literature on income comparisons (e.g., Hamilton 2000). The main reasons for this 
disparity are that this paper pays particular attention to the underreporting issue, largely ignored 
elsewhere, and the choice of annual income versus hourly wage comparisons. None of the recent 
income comparisons of self-employed and the wage worker controls for the income 
underreporting by the self-employed. I find significant evidence of income underreporting by the 
self-employed which casts doubts on conclusions stating that self-employment is not as 
financially rewarding as wage work.  
Comparisons undertaken in this paper find that the self-employed are better off in terms 
of both income and consumption, even after controlling for education, experience, and 
demographic variables. Perhaps the entire income definitions need to be re-written whenever 
evaluating self-employment. Researchers need to be very careful in separating business expenses 
from those of pure consumption. Having said that, there is often no clear line about the 
proportions of good’s used for many mixed purpose expenses (cars are a good example of this). 
In this paper I address the issue of mixed purpose expenses by reducing the vehicle category to 
exclude various types of cars, some of which appear to carry much smaller consumption utility 
and much larger business purpose. At the same time this paper does not address a full addition of 
the fringe benefits to the rest of the consumption due to data availability. Therefore, even the 
consumption measures created here are only limited representatives as both large categories, such 
as fringe benefits, as well as small categories of incidental spending and numerous services 
categories are not accounted for in the survey. There should be no situation in which self-
employed people with similar characteristics earn less; this is because they can simply close shop 
and move into wage employment. The only scenario where the above situation can persist is 
when there are some benefits not captured by income. I argue that consumption captures some of 
the benefits not reflected by income (for example personal use of business assets). At the end of 
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the day, the self-employed consume more and are thus better off. These differences are both 
robust to changes in definitions of consumption and persistent across the two distributions.  
Annual earnings comparisons are a better metric because entrepreneurs can choose to work more 
hours whenever business conditions allow whereas wage earners mostly depend on the 
entrepreneurs (and managers) to make these choices for them. Because of current law structure 
workers are usually more motivated to work overtime (since they get paid more than their regular 
fare); in most cases, they are not able to work the hours that they want. Earnings, in the end of the 
day, are only the means necessary for the acquisition of goods and services. It is goods and 
services (current or future) that people are really after. Hence, consumption comparison is a more 
direct metric in comparison of benefits to employment across groups. For example, a much fuller 
picture of how taxing unemployment is could be drawn by examining individual's consumption 
before, during, and after the unemployment spell, as the actual hardships can be observed by 
looking at substitutions in consumption.  
The long term effects of business ownership, while non-negative on average, do not seem 
to persist for people returning to the wage sector. This is because there could be various reasons 
responsible for the end of business tenure. At one extreme, a business may end because it was a 
complete failure, while at the other termination of a business could be the result of a successful 
sale by the entrepreneur.  
Some limitations arise from consumption comparisons done on the household level. The 
self-employed, in this context, are households that have someone who is self-employed as a 
member. Any changes in household makeup can move the household into either wage or self-
employment category, having nothing to do with either business origination or the termination of 
such venue. For the self-employed still in business, previous business ownership is correlated 
with current increase of consumption as one would expect. Unfortunately, since the PSID has 
only recently started to track expenditure variables, our ability to measure long-run effects is very 
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limited. This is the limitation of cross-section analysis, which can only be corrected with 
evaluation of the panel data.   
Better income estimates need to be constructed in the future with income underreporting 
corrections made for the self-employed. The obvious difficulty lies in estimating the magnitude of 
underreporting. Perhaps a long panel data containing income, consumption, assets, and 
employment data needs to be examined, as the cross-section analysis is able to detect the 
underreporting issues but not correct for them. 
 
. 
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APPENDICIES 
Appendix 1 
i) Note that 	߲ܤ௡ ߲݊	ൗ  is clearly positive since:  
	డ஻೙
డ௡	 ൌ
஢ഄ ஢ಔమሺ௦̅ି୥ሺ௦̅ሻሻ
൫஢ഄమା௡஢ಔమ൯ ׬ ௘షభ మൗ ೟మಮሺഁష೛ෝሻ
ಚഄ
൘
ௗ௧  with all parameters larger than zero and E(̅ݏ െ
gሺ̅ݏሻሻ free of n as well.  
 
ii) In the case of 	߲ܤ௡ ߲ߪఌ		ൗ ,there are no clear-cut signs of the derivative; parameters 
produce both positive and negative results. Nonetheless, some bounds could be 
established, for example in order for 	߲ܤ௡ ߲ߪఌ		ൗ ൐ 0 there is a necessary and 
sufficient condition 
 
Proof: 
Note that after taking expectations: 
 
	߲ܤ௡ ߲ߪఌ		ൗ ൌ
ଶ௘
షሺഁషഋሻ
మ
మ഑ഄమ
షሺഋషഁሻ
మ
మ഑ഄమ ௡ሺఉିఓሻఙഋమ
గఙഄమ൫௡ఙഋమାఙഄమ൯ሺଵାா௥௙൤ഋషഁ√మ഑ഄ൨ሻ
మ െ
ଶ௡௘
షሺഋషഁሻ
మ
మ഑ഄమ ටమഏఙഋమఙഄమ
൫௡ఙഋమାఙഄమ൯మሺଵାா௥௙൤ഋషഁ√మ഑ഄ൨ሻ
൅ ௘
షሺഋషഁሻ
మ
మ഑ഄమ ටమഏ௡ఙഋమ
൫௡ఙഋమାఙഄమ൯ሺଵାா௥௙൤ഋషഁ√మ഑ഄ൨ሻ
൅
௘
షሺഋషഁሻ
మ
మ഑ഄమ ටమഏሺఓିఉሻమ௡ఙഋమ
ఙഄమ൫௡ఙഋమାఙഄమ൯ሺଵାா௥௙൤ഋషഁ√మ഑ഄ൨ሻ
(A) 
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Now to see how can 	߲ܤ௡ ߲ߪఌ		ൗ ൐ 0  I re-arrange and simplify (A) equation to 
compare first two terms to the second two, the resulting necessary and sufficient 
condition is then given by: 
 
	߲ܤ௡ ߲ߪఌ		ൗ ൐ 0       ࢏ࢌࢌ           
ଶ௘
షሺഁష೛ෝሻ
మ
మ഑ഄమ ሺ௣ොିఉሻ
√ଶగሺଵିா௥௙ሺഁష೛ሻ෢√మ഑ഄሻ
൅ 	 ଶఙഄర௡ఙഋమାఙഄమ ൏ 	ߪఌ
ଶ ൅ ሺ݌̂ െ ߚሻଶ 
From which it clearly follows that assuming			ߪఌଶ ൐ ଶఙഄ
ర
௡ఙഋమାఙഄమ			, ሺ݌̂ െ ߚሻ
ଶ ൐
ଶ௘
షሺഁష೛ෝሻ
మ
మ഑ഄమ ሺ௣ොିఉሻ
√ଶగሺଵିா௥௙ሺഁష೛ሻ෢√మ഑ഄሻ
 are a sufficient and necessary condition for above inequality to 
hold	∎ 
There is also a range of parameters for which 	߲ܤ௡ ߲ߪఌ		ൗ ൏ 0  . It is clear that reversing 
the inequality signs produces the two necessary and sufficient conditions for that range of 
parameters. 
iii) 	߲ܤ௡ ߲ߪఓ		൘ ൐ 0 for all values of parameters, this follows from the fact that 
differentiating Bias with respect to prior variance yields: 
	߲ܤ௡ ߲ߪఓ		൘ ൌ 	
2	݁ି
ሺఓିఉሻమ
ଶఙഄమ ݊ଶට2ߨ ߪఓ	ߪఌ	
൫݊ߪఓଶ ൅ ߪఌଶ൯ሺ1 ൅ ܧݎ݂ ቈߤ െ ߚ√2ߪఌ
቉ሻ
െ
2	݁ି
ሺఓିఉሻమ
ଶఙഄమ ݊ට2ߨ ߪఓଷߪఌ	
൫݊ߪఓଶ ൅ ߪఌଶ൯ଶሺ1 ൅ ܧݎ݂ ቈߤ െ ߚ√2ߪఌ
቉ሻ
 
       which can be easily simplified to: 
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	߲ܤ௡ ߲ߪఓ		൘ ൌ
2	݁ି
ሺఓିఉሻమ
ଶఙഄమ ට2ߨ ߪఌଷ݊ߪఓ	
൫݊ߪఓଶ ൅ ߪఌଶ൯ଶሺ1 ൅ ܧݎ݂ ቈߤ െ ߚ√2ߪఌ
቉ሻ
 
It is immediately clear that 	߲ܤ௡ ߲ߪఓ		൘ ൐ 0. 
iv) 	߲ܤ௡ ߲ߚ	ൗ  could also take on both positive and negative values depending on 
parameters since differentiating with respect to the truncation point yields: 
 
	߲ܤ௡ ߲ߚ	ൗ
ൌ 2݁
ିሺఉିఓሻ
మ
ଶఙഄమ ି
ሺఓିఉሻమ
ଶఙഄమ ݊ߪఓଶ
ߨ൫݊ߪఓଶ ൅ ߪఌଶ൯ ሺ1 ൅ ܧݎ݂ ቈߤ െ ߚ√2ߪఌ
቉ሻଶ
െ
݁ି
ሺఓିఉሻమ
ଶఙഄమ ට2ߨ ሺߤ െ ߚሻ ݊ߪఓଶ
ߪఌ	൫݊ߪఓଶ ൅ ߪఌଶ൯ ቆ1 ൅ ܧݎ݂ ቈߤ െ ߚ√2ߪఌ
቉ቇ
				ሺBሻ 
               
 
where in case of severe truncation (ߚ ൐ ߤ) it is clear that 	߲ܤ௡ ߲ߚ	ൗ ൐ 0. In the case 
of milder truncation (ߚ ൏ ߤ) this result is more difficult to obtain. More specifically 
an additional condition needs to be imposed.   
Rearranging (B), while assuming	ߚ ൏ ߤ, it becomes clear that  
	߲ܤ௡ ߲ߚ	ൗ ൐ 0																												 iff              2ߪఌ 	݁
ିሺഋషഁሻమమ഑ഄమ ൐ √2ߨ	ሺ݌̂ െ ߚሻ ቀ1 ൅
ܧݎ݂ ቂఓିఉ√ଶఙഄቃቁ 
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Dynamics 
 
Note that while Equation 13 has no impact on bias we need to make sure solution 
exists and that is finite. 
ݏ݋݈ݑݐ݅݋݊	ݐ݋	ߪ௧ାଵ ൌ
σఌଶσఓሺ௧ሻଶ
σఓሺ௧ሻଶ ൅ ݊σఌଶ
						݅ݏ					ߪఓሺ௧ሻ ൌ
ሺ݊ െ 1ሻ݊ߪఌଶ
݊௧ାଵ െ ݊௧ߪఌଶ ൅ ݊௧ାଵߪఌଶ െ ݊		 
Assuming that initial condition constant is equal to 1. Clearly above solution converges 
to 0. 
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Appendix 2 
 
2.A. Unit Roots Tests for Stationarity 
The Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) test specifies a set of augmented Dickey-Fuller regressions of the 
form 
∆ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߮௜ݕ௜.௧ିଵ ൅ ࢠ௜௧ᇱ ߛ௜ ൅ ߳௜௧ 
where ߮௜ is a panel-specific constant with an underlining assumption that ߳௜௧~݅݅݀ for all i and t 
(Im, Pesaran et al. 2003). Hypotheses specification is that the null hypotheses ߮௜ ൌ 0 for all i. 
The alternative is that the fraction of panels that are stationary is larger than zero. Let that fraction 
be represented by number A. The IPS test allows for the heterogeneous panels with serially 
uncorrelated errors for T periods and N panels. An asymptotic assumption is that	ܶ → ∞. Test 
statistics arises from the fact that as	ܰ → ∞, ܣ ܰൗ  is a non-zero value. Using the IPS as a base 
Fisher type tests combine the p-values from panel-specific test using inverse	߯ଶ, inverse normal, 
inverse logit, and inverse ߯ଶ transformed to suit ܰ → ∞ (Choi 2001).   
The test statistics for augmented Dickey-Fuller tests are as follows: 
 
ܣܦܨ௧ ൌ ݐఝୀଵ ൌ
ො߮ െ 1
ܵܧሺ߮ሻ 
ܣܦܨ௡ ൌ
ܶሺ ො߮ െ 1ሻ
1 െ ̂ݖଵ െ ⋯ ̂ݖ௣ 
 
Table A1. Unit-root tests using the augmented Dickey-Fuller specification 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots 
Ha: At least on panel is stationary  
 Number of panels           14381 
Avg. number of periods  17.74 
AR parameter: Panel specific  
Panel means:  Included 
 Asymptotics: 												 ܶ → ∞ 
ADF regressions:      1 lag  
 Statistic P-value 
Inverse chi-squared (25424)        P   100076 1.000 
Inverse normal                           Z 44.4336 1.000 
Inverse logit t(43894)                 L 35.6421 1.000 
Modified inv.chi-squared           Pm -34.9105 1.000 
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I also employ Phillips-Perron (PP) type of specification as the other alternative specification of 
the unit-root structure. The regression for the PP test is: 
∆ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߚ௜ᇱࡰ௜௧ ൅ ߨ௜ݕ௜௧ ൅ ݑ௜௧ 
where D is the vector of deterministic parameters (constant, trend etc.). The PP tests correct for 
any serial correlation and hetroksedasticity  in errors ݑ௜௧ of the regression by modifying the test 
statistic ݐగୀ଴	and ݐగෝ	. The statistics denoted ܼ௧and ܼగare given by 
ܼ௧ ൌ ቆ
ߪොଶ
ߣመଶቇ
ଵ ଶൗ
∙ ݐగୀ଴	 െ
1
2ቆ
ߣመଶ െ ߪොଶ
ߣመଶ ቇ ∙ ൬
ܶ ∙ ܵܧሺߨොሻ
ߪොଶ ൰ 
ܼగ ൌ గܶෝ െ
1
2
ܶଶ ∙ ܵܧሺߨොሻ
ߪොଶ ൫ߣመ
ଶ െ ߪොଶ൯ 
with terms ߣመଶand ߪොଶas consistent estimates of the variance parameters  
ߪଶ ൌ 	 lim்→ஶܶ
ିଵ෍ܧሾݑ௧ଶሿ
்
௧ୀଵ
 
ߣଶ ൌ 	 lim்→ஶ෍ܧሾܶ
ିଵܵଶ்ሿ
்
௧ୀଵ
 
where ்ܵ ൌ ∑ ݑ௧௧்ୀଵ . 
 
 
 
Table A2. Unit-root tests using the Phillips-Perron specification 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots 
Ha: At least on panel is stationary  
 Number of panels           14381 
Avg. number of periods  17.74 
AR parameter: Panel specific  
Panel means:  Included 
 Asymptotics: 												 ܶ → ∞ 
ADF regressions:      1 lag  
 Statistic P-value 
Inverse chi-squared (25424)        P   241076 1.000 
Inverse normal                           Z 26.5549 1.000 
Inverse logit t(43894)                 L 21.3670 1.000 
Modified inv. chi-squared           
Pm 
-14.9941 1.000 
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2.B. Confidence Intervals and sample sizes for Table 2. 
Three numbers are reported in each cell. The top (bottom) number is the upper (lower) 95 percent 
confidence bound for the means given in Table 2. The middle numbers record the number of 
transitions observed.  
 
Table B1. Confidence Intervals and sample sizes for 
(one- month transition rates) 
PanelA. Business owners in both periods 
 Business Owners, t+1 
1(t+1) 2(t+1) 3(t+1) 4(t+1) 5(t+1) 
B
us
in
es
s O
w
ne
rs
, t
 
1(t) 75.3 
1,935  
78.6 
9.2 
262 
11.6 
3.6 
111 
5.2 
2.7 
86 
4.1 
3.9 
120 
5.6 
2(t) 8 
219 
10.3 
71 
1,737 
74.6 
9.5 
257 
12 
3 
90 
4.5 
2.7 
83 
4.2 
3(t) 3.5 
101 
5.1 
8.6 
231 
11 
68.3 
1,647 
72 
9.8 
261 
12.4 
3.7 
107 
5.4 
4(t) 2.6 
85 
4 
2.1 
71 
3.4 
7.7 
224 
9.8 
70.7 
1,854 
74.2 
11.4 
326 
14 
5(t) 2 
100 
3 
1.2 
64 
2 
2.5 
122 
3.6 
5.8 
263 
7.3 
85.2 
3,453 
87.3 
 
Panel B. Wage workers in both periods  
 Wage Earners, t+1 
1(t+1) 2(t+1) 3(t+1) 4(t+1) 5(t+1) 
W
ag
e 
Ea
rn
er
s, 
t 
1(t) 60.7 
22,888 
61.7 
11.8 
 4,542 
12.5 
8.7 
3,370 
9.3 
8.4 
3,254 
9 
8.7 
3,348 
9.2 
2(t) 10.3 
4,426 
10.9 
56.8 
23,860 
57.8 
14.1 
6,028 
14.8 
8.7 
3,741 
9.3 
8.3 
3,574 
8.9 
3(t) 7.6 
3,329 
8.2 
13.8 
5,959 
14.5 
52.2 
22,196 
53.1 
16.2 
6,993 
16.9 
8.5 
3,685 
9 
4(t) 7.3 
3,364 
7.8 
8.1 
3,701 
8.6 
15.3 
6,906 
15.9 
52.6 
23,516 
53.6 
15 
6,799 
15.7 
5(t) 7.3 
3,40 
7.8 
7.6 
3,529 
8.1 
7.9 
3,656 
8.4 
14.6 
6,718 
15.2 
61.1 
27,758 
62 
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Panel C. Wage workers establishing a business   
 Business Owners, t+1 
1(t+1) 2(t+1) 3(t+1) 4(t+1) 5(t+1) 
W
ag
e 
Ea
rn
er
s, 
t 
1(t) 8.5 
14 
24.8 
1.5 
6 
12.8 
10.5 
16 
27.6 
13.5 
19 
21.8 
24.1 
29 
44.9 
2(t) 2.1 
6 
17.5 
4.4 
8 
21.8 
8.1 
11 
28 
12.1 
14 
33.8 
23.7 
22 
48.5 
3(t) 7.3 
12 
23.9 
4.3 
9 
19 
5.3 
10 
20.7 
9.4 
14 
27 
30.3 
22 
52.8 
4(t) 8.2 
13 
25.1 
11.3 
16 
29.7 
2.5 
7 
15.5 
12.4 
17 
31.2 
21.5 
25 
42.6 
5(t) 7.1 
13 
22.1 
6.2 
12 
20.7 
7.1 
13 
22.1 
14.6 
21 
32.6 
23.7 
30 
43.7 
 
 
Panel D. Business owners transitioning in to wage work 
 Business Owners, t+1 
1(t+1) 2(t+1) 3(t+1) 4(t+1) 5(t+1) 
B
us
in
es
s O
w
ne
rs
, t
 
1(t) 13 
15 
34.6 
7.8 
11 
27.1 
5.4 
9 
23.2 
6.6 
10 
25.2 
17.1 
18 
40 
2(t) 8.6 
12 
27.7 
13.6 
16 
34.9 
8.6 
12 
27.7 
5.1 
9 
22.1 
14.9 
17 
36.6 
3(t) 10.9 
13 
32.4 
10.9 
13 
32.4 
9.6 
12 
30.4 
12.3 
14 
34.4 
4.5 
8 
22.2 
4(t) 9.1 
13 
27.5 
6.9 
11 
24.1 
15 
18 
35.7 
15 
18 
35.7 
6.9 
11 
24.1 
5(t) 9.3 
18 
23.2 
7.8 
16 
21.1 
13.1 
23 
28.4 
17 
28 
33.4 
17 
26 
33.4 
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2.C. Confidence Intervals and sample sizes for 4M income transitions 
Three numbers are reported in each cell. The top (bottom) number is the upper (lower) 95 percent 
confidence bound for the means given in Table 4. The middle numbers record the number of 
transitions observed. 
 
Table B1. Confidence Intervals and sample sizes for 
(4M transition rates, 4M income) 
PanelA. Business owners in both periods 
 Business Owners, t+1 
1(t+1) 2(t+1) 3(t+1) 4(t+1) 5(t+1) 
B
us
in
es
s O
w
ne
rs
, t
 
1(t) 61.3 
133 
74.5 
2 
10 
8.2 
2.7 
12 
9.5 
7.6 
24 
16.9 
4.7 
17 
12.6 
2(t) 2.2 
11 
8.4 
52 
121 
65.5 
3.3 
14 
10.3 
9.7 
30 
19.4 
9.7 
30 
19.4 
3(t) 1.6 
11 
6.1 
5.5 
25 
12.1 
53.4 
168 
64.9 
8.2 
34 
15.8 
11.9 
46 
20.5 
4(t) 2.6 
17 
7.1 
4.2 
24 
9.5 
6.6 
34 
12.9 
55.9 
213 
66.2 
13.5 
61 
21.5 
5(t) 3.3 
26 
7.3 
4.8 
35 
9.4 
7.5 
50 
12.8 
8.5 
56 
14.2 
61.9 
326 
70.3 
Panel B. Wage workers in both periods  
 Wage Earners, t+1 
1(t+1) 2(t+1) 3(t+1) 4(t+1) 5(t+1) 
W
ag
e 
Ea
rn
er
s, 
t 
1(t) 51.7 
29,160 
52.5 
11.9 
6,785 
12.4 
12.1 
6,903 
12.6 
11.5 
6,590 
12 
11.3 
6,496 
11.9 
2(t) 14.3 
7,034 
14.9 
20.4 
9,976 
21.1 
21.4 
10,472 
22.2 
21.4 
10,469 
22.1 
20.7 
10,117 
21.4 
3(t) 13.3 
6,895 
13.9 
20.4 
10,499 
21.1 
22 
11,315 
22.7 
21.8 
11,241 
22.5 
20.8 
10,720 
21.5 
4(t) 13.2 
6,767 
13.8 
20.4 
10,387 
21.1 
22 
11,218 
22.7 
21.7 
11,055 
22.4 
21 
10,691 
21.7 
5(t) 13.1 
6,524 
13.41 
20 
9,910 
20.7 
21.4 
10,613 
22.2 
21.9 
10,859 
22.7 
21.7 
10,754 
22.5 
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Panel C. Wage workers establishing a business   
 Business Owners, t+1 
1(t+1) 2(t+1) 3(t+1) 4(t+1) 5(t+1) 
W
ag
e 
Ea
rn
er
s, 
t 
1(t) 3.1 
5 
36.9 
3.1 
5 
36.9 
0 
1 
12.3 
9.1 
7 
46.9 
9.1 
7 
46.9 
2(t) 20.4 
10 
62.9 
0 
2 
20.3 
0 
3 
26.8 
0.06 
4 
32.7 
3.3 
5 
38.4 
3(t) 10.1 
9 
39.9 
2 
5 
25.8 
0.3 
4 
21.9 
3.9 
6 
29.5 
17.2 
12 
49.5 
4(t) 8.6 
6 
54.6 
0 
3 
33.8 
4.5 
5 
48.1 
0 
2 
25.7 
0 
3 
33.8 
5(t) 7.5 
8 
34.6 
9.5 
9 
37.8 
7.5 
8 
34.6 
0.3 
4 
20.7 
9.5 
9 
37.8 
 
 
Panel D. Business owners transitioning in to wage work 
 Business Owners, t+1 
1(t+1) 2(t+1) 3(t+1) 4(t+1) 5(t+1) 
B
us
in
es
s O
w
ne
rs
, t
 
1(t) 0 
2 
15.6 
7 
7 
38.2 
7 
7 
38.2 
9.5 
8 
42.1 
7 
7 
38.2 
2(t) 8 
8 
36.5 
8 
8 
36.5 
5.9 
7 
33 
3.9 
6 
29.5 
5.9 
7 
33 
3(t) 4.5 
6 
33 
9.1 
8 
40.9 
17 
11 
51.8 
0 
3 
20.1 
0.4 
4 
24.6 
4(t) 16.4 
11 
50.3 
2.2 
5 
28.1 
4.3 
6 
32.1 
2.2 
5 
28.1 
4.3 
6 
32.1 
5(t) 5.5 
6 
39 
0 
0 
0 
14.3 
9 
52.3 
8.3 
7 
43.6 
2.9 
5 
34.2 
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Appendix 3 
Regressions for Table 11 
Additional Evidence of Underreporting (Median Estimates) 
Dependent variable expenditure in thousands, ***α=0.01. **α=0.05. *α=0.1 
 
A1. Current propensities to save using 1995 employment status. 
 Current Wage Earners Current Self-employed 
Income .000177722*** (.0000139353) 
.0001760637*** 
(.0000280074) 
Education 1.657036*** (.2229091) 
.8809366 
(.9877422) 
Race White 1.955574* (1.185384) 
3.24959 
(2.936027) 
Experience -.0536193 (.06186582) 
.1522846 
(.2037608) 
Family size -4.55209*** (.9903618) 
-2.519669* 
(1.390202) 
(Self-Employed 
1995)x(2005 Income) 
.000177722*** 
(.0000139353) 
.0000807228*** 
(.0000277231) 
Constant -12.2845*** (2.670906) 
-6.404724 
(15.07987) 
 N=817, R2=0.089  N=158, R2=0.16 
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A2. Current propensities to save using 1996 employment status. 
 Current Wage Earners Current Self-employed 
Income .0001881638*** (.00001257319) 
.0001595584*** 
(.0000281575) 
Education 1.854621*** (.2482233) 
.8614481 
(.9150135) 
Race White 2.927793** (1.410048) 
2.456798 
(2.872762) 
Experience .03436921 (.0685051) 
.1516165 
(.1855706) 
Family size -4.670029*** (.9261412) 
-2.331599* 
(1.347432) 
(Self-Employed 
1996)x(2005 Income) 
-.0001698983*** 
(.0000125199) 
.0000980634*** 
(.0000276934) 
Constant -15.9463*** (3.210247) 
-6.16006 
(13.28564) 
 N=839, R2=0.096  N=164, R2=0.16 
 
A3. Current propensities to save using 1997 employment status. 
 Current Wage Earners Current Self-employed 
Income .0001901903*** (.0000123907) 
.0001842529*** 
(.0000328447) 
Education 1.077878*** (.1617026) 
1.181003 
(.9881792) 
Race White 2.61863** (1.099963) 
.9665809 
(5.519584) 
Experience .07094096 (.05348281) 
-.01802031 
(.1775672) 
Family size -4.265715*** (.8894281) 
-2.910628* 
(1.527428) 
(Self-Employed 
1997)x(2005 Income) 
-.0001711012*** 
(.0000096425) 
.000070879** 
(.0000325506) 
Constant -7.234556*** (2.093277) 
-5.58392 
(14.2219) 
 N=957, R2=0.089  N=171, R2=0.16 
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A4. Current propensities to save using 1999 employment status. 
 Current Wage Earners Current Self-employed 
Income .0002188864*** (.0000143044) 
.000258373*** 
(.0000279386) 
Education .5615408*** (.1646435) 
.6577603 
(1.196253) 
Race White 2.718512** (1.099693) 
-1.640338 
(6.437674) 
Experience .02313125 (.05157134) 
-.07083331 
(.2362744) 
Family size -4.547023*** (.8895046) 
-2.744733 
(1.839639) 
(Self-Employed 
1999)x(2005 Income) 
-.0001974567*** 
(.0000112482) 
.0000381247 
(.0000280574) 
Constant -.9092512 (2.119199) 
1.817691 
(16.97725) 
 N=1067, R2=0.096  N=182, R2=0.16 
 
A5. Current propensities to save using 2001 employment status. 
 Current Wage Earners Current Self-employed 
Income .0001911024*** (.0000164882) 
.0002293289*** 
(.0000318041) 
Education .8929879*** (.1756677) 
-.07335361 
(1.176397) 
Race White 2.397245** (1.055269) 
-2.522549 
(6.93356) 
Experience .0386792 (.05366305) 
-.05446202 
(.2110872) 
Family size -4.377966*** (.7391648) 
-2.775846 
(1.959667) 
(Self-Employed 
2001)x(2005 Income) 
-.000011739 
(.0000180819) 
.0000697666** 
(.0000318041) 
Constant -4.705587** (2.161508) 
13.48344 
(16.28237) 
 N=1185, R2=0.097  N=192, R2=0.16 
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A6. Current propensities to save using 2003 employment status. 
 Current Wage Earners Current Self-employed 
Income .0001943649*** (.0000142112) 
.0001527923*** 
(.0000287006) 
Education .8216306*** (.1513525) 
.7662472 
(.9020232) 
Race White 2.110387** (.8718046) 
1.331547 
(5.466565) 
Experience .05597175 (.04399514) 
-.06633353 
(.1992514) 
Family size -4.574083*** (.6220216) 
-3.100908** 
(1.464956) 
(Self-Employed 
2003)x(2005 Income) 
-.000313388** 
(.0000142112) 
.0000113688*** 
(.0000284406) 
Constant -3.494536* (1.836009) 
.6483869 
(11.23985) 
 N=1351, R2=0.077  N=212, R2=0.16 
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Long Run Effects (Median Estimates) 
Dependent variable expenditure in thousands, ***α=0.01. **α=0.05. *α=0.1 
 
A7. Effects of 1995 employment status on current expenditure. 
 Current Wage Earners Current Self-employed 
Education 7.076*** (.6638936) 
10.75564*** 
(2.684138) 
Race White 8.312667** (3.350804) 
5.244272 
(20.56587) 
Experience .209333 (.1735715) 
-.6293636 
(.6929092) 
Family size -6.696444** (2.801582) 
-8.889273 
(11.63469) 
Self-Employed 1995 18.18467*** (5.656639) 
28.57373** 
(12.81543) 
Constant -54.56933*** (9.051145) 
-84.50963 
(42.65558) 
 N=915, R2=0.050 N=185, R2=0.061 
 
A8. Effects of 1996 employment status on current expenditure. 
 Current Wage Earners Current Self-employed 
Education 7.508965*** (.6356214) 
10.800*** 
(2.150845) 
Race White 7.426621** (3.236627) 
-1.895273 
(15.52712) 
Experience .2998621* (.1652749) 
-.1398182 
(.5208083) 
Family size -7.151724** (2.691952) 
-21.42982* 
(11.07528) 
Self-Employed 1996 11.25234** (4.895187) 
28.06273*** 
(9.957066) 
Constant -60.25434*** (8.640316) 
-82.30836 
(33.05751) 
 N=942, R2=0.053 N=192, R2=0.063 
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A9. Effects of 1997 employment status on current expenditure. 
 Current Wage Earners Current Self-employed 
Education 4.857238*** (.5156421) 
9.74377*** 
(1.848756) 
Race White 6.122857* (3.132357) 
6.303385 
(12.97612) 
Experience .2480952 (.1569289) 
.5830769 
(.4479618) 
Family size -8.289571*** (2.783942) 
-8.897693 
(10.04055) 
Self-Employed 1997 4.538 (4.771968) 
2.083077 
(9.8912681) 
Constant -24.17914*** (7.28194) 
-78.05108 
(27.67717) 
 N=1073, R2=0.040 N=202, R2=0.060 
 
 
A10. Effects of 1999 employment status on current expenditure. 
 Current Wage Earners Current Self-employed 
Education 4.887877*** (.4741486) 
7.911467*** 
(1.458155) 
Race White 6.631234** (2.822728) 
11.67733 
(10.34467) 
Experience .4017284*** (.1447127) 
.3026667 
(.3707955) 
Family size -9.086362*** (2.500521) 
-14.45367** 
(6.099329) 
Self-Employed 1999 1.227868 (4.913084) 
1.9696 
(7.047) 
Constant -26.80052*** (6.677371) 
-58.2656*** 
(22.05197) 
 N=1198, R2=0.040 N=214, R2=0.056 
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A11. Effects of 2001 employment status on current expenditure. 
 Current Wage Earners Current Self-employed 
Education 4.68387*** (.3860218) 
8.039644*** 
(2.290889) 
Race White 6.402304*** (2.227324) 
1.044633 
(16.38391) 
Experience .469087*** (.1145432) 
.01542573 
(.5648374) 
Family size -6.654967*** (1.688007) 
-16.84731* 
(10.10809) 
Self-Employed 2001 3.715022 (3.836145) 
14.87653 
(11.09489) 
Constant -26.50613*** (5.33793) 
-50.58998 
(34.7174) 
 N=1330, R2=0.050 N=226, R2=0.057 
 
 
A12. Effects of 2003 employment status on current expenditure. 
 Current Wage Earners Current Self-employed 
Education 4.426252*** (.3441727) 
7.710286*** 
(1.309546) 
Race White 7.48526*** (1.95912) 
6.867858 
(8.996112) 
Experience .4786866*** (.1008178) 
.4078571 
(.33343) 
Family size -6.519347*** (1.50875) 
-7.574286 
(7.192842) 
Self-Employed 2003 .02457672 (3.837547) 
7.814 
(6.44438) 
Constant -25.2937*** (4.744954) 
-58.376*** 
(19.3729) 
 N=1517, R2=0.037 N=248, R2=0.049 
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